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For more than two decades, scholars working from an economic
perspective have criticized the bankruptcy reorganization process
and sought to replace it with market mechanisms. In 2002, Profes-
sors Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen asserted in The
End of Bankruptcy that improvements in the market for large public
companies had rendered reorganization obsolete. Going concern
value could be captured through sale. This Article reports the re-
sults of an empirical study comparing the recoveries in bankruptcy
sales of large public companies in the period 2000 through 2004
with the recoveries in bankruptcy reorganizations during the same
period. Controlling for company values measured at case com-
mencement and operating profits, the recoveries in reorganization
cases are more than double the recoveries from going concern
sales. The authors attribute the low recoveries in sale cases to con-
tinuing market illiquidity, managers' and professional advisors'
conflicts of interest, and the corruption of the bankruptcy process
by competition among bankruptcy courts for large public company
cases. As a result, debtors agree to sell at low prices, the auctions
are rushed, and in most cases only a single bidder participates. The
authors also report other sale characteristics. Bankruptcy recover-
ies are higher when debt capacity in the debtor's industry is
lower-the opposite of the effect predicted by Professors Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny in their landmark article in 1992.
Cases in which debtors sell their companies as going concerns-
often in the first few months-on average remain pending signifi-
cantly longer than reorganization cases. Bankruptcy recoveries are
high in years when merger and acquisition activity is high for rea-
sons other than high stock prices. Lastly, the number and
proportion of bankruptcy sales have sharply declined in the past
two years, suggesting that the sale era may be ending.
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INTRODUCTION
[Tihe best way to determine [bankrupt company] value is exposure to a
market.
-United States Supreme Court (1999)'
Q. So the 20 million dollars in [estimated collectible] receivables is in-
cluded in the assets that the purchaser is purchasing for 15.8 million
dollars?
A. That's correct.
-Hearing on the sale of Network Plus Corporation
as a going concern for 4% of book value2




Bankruptcy reorganization provides a remedy for capital market inade-
quacy. It protects from dismemberment finns whose value cannot be realized
through sale or preserved by soliciting investment in capital markets. Law and
economics scholars-strong believers in the marketplace-are skeptical of the
need for reorganization. They either deny the market's inadequacy or seek to
design substitute markets. For decades, they have debated how best to end
reorganization.
In 2002, two leading scholars, Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen,
suddenly declared the mission accomplished. In the opening sentence of an
article titled The End of Bankruptcy, Baird and Rasmussen claimed that
"[c]orporate reorganizations have all but disappeared."3 They argued as fol-
lows:
In the nineteenth century, no single group of investors could amass the
capital needed to buy large firms, and the market for small ones was unde-
veloped. Today, both small and large firms can be sold as going concerns,
inside of bankruptcy and out. The ability to sell entire firms and divisions
eliminates the need for a collective forum in which the different players
must come to an agreement about what should happen to the assets. That
4decision can be left to the new owners.
Baird and Rasmussen concluded that "[t]he days when reorganization law
promised substantial benefits are gone."5 Later, Baird expanded on the
claim, writing that "[t]oday, creditors of insolvent businesses ... no longer
need a substitute for a market sale. Instead of providing a substitute for a
market sale, chapter 11 now serves as the forum where such sales are con-
ducted. 6
In this Article, we present empirical evidence that reorganization remains
essential for dealing with distressed large public companies. We compared the
prices for which thirty large public companies were sold with the values of
thirty similar companies that were reorganized in the period 2000 through
2004. We found that companies sold for an average of 35% of book value but
reorganized for an average fresh-start value of 80% of book value and an av-
erage market capitalization value-based on post-reorganization stock
2. Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable Peter J. Walsh United States Bankruptcy
Judge at 71, In re Network Plus Corporation, No. 02-10341, (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 25, 2002). The
witness testified that "the 55 million dollar receivable is an included asset so the purchaser is taking
over those receivables, and it's our best estimate that 20 million dollars will be collected by the
purchaser." Id.
3. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
751, 751 (2002) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy]. In a later essay they clarified
that they claim only the disappearance of "traditional reorganizations." Douglas G. Baird & Robert
K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 674 (2003) [hereinafter Baird &
Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight] ("As we claimed in The End of Bankruptcy, traditional reor-
ganizations have largely disappeared.").
4. Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 756.
5. Id. at 789.




trading-of 91% of book value.7 Even controlling for the differences in the
prefiling earnings of the two sets of companies, sale yielded less than half as
much value as reorganization. These results suggest that creditors and
shareholders can more than double their recoveries by reorganizing large
public companies instead of selling them.
Part I of this Article examines the reorganization process and explains
why the market is an inadequate substitute. It then briefly describes law-
and-economics scholars' efforts to fashion market substitutes for bankruptcy
reorganization and elaborates on Baird and Rasmussen's claim that the mar-
ket has in fact replaced reorganization.
Part II describes the methodology employed in our study, and Part III
presents our findings. Those findings include a regression model that shows
the choice between reorganization and sale to be a principal determinant of
the value realized in the bankruptcy of a large public company. The compa-
nies sold had significantly lower earnings than the companies reorganized,
but even controlling for that difference, sales produced much less value than
reorganizations.
Part IV attempts to explain the market failure we document. The obvious
problem is insufficient market liquidity. That problem, we argue, is com-
pounded by managers' personal incentives to sell their companies for
inadequate prices. In addition, the investment banks that advise those man-
agers have interests of their own that may conflict with price maximization.
Unsecured creditors-the principal losers when distressed companies are
sold-sometimes object to the sales. But bankruptcy institutions discourage
the objectors and impair their pursuit.
Bankruptcy law charges bankruptcy judges with the responsibility to
prevent inadequate-price sales. But the judges are powerless to do so, be-
cause a historical accident placed the bankruptcy courts in competition for
large public company bankruptcies. That accident gave the parties who se-
lect venue for bankruptcy cases-the debtor's managers, debtor-in-
possession ("DIP") lenders, and professional advisors-the right to choose
their bankruptcy courts. These parties prefer courts that will not scrutinize
the adequacy of the prices at which they have chosen to sell, and there is no
shortage of bankruptcy courts willing to bend the law as necessary to ac-
commodate them. Appellate remedies are rarely available to challenge sale
prices.'
In nearly every instance, the sales we examined were "market-tested" by
public auction. But those auctions failed to prevent inadequate-price sales.
In most cases, only a single bidder appeared. We interpret the data as show-
7. These percentages are calculated using the raw values of the underlying variables. Con-
sequently they are skewed positive. The resulting mean values are systematically higher than the
medians. The natural logs of the percentages (the ratios) are used in the regression analysis in order
to compensate for the skew and to provide more reliable estimates. The corresponding values of
these percentages, using the logged variables and not controlling for Earnings Before Interest,
Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization ("EBITDA"), are 26% for sale value, 67% for fresh start
value, and 76% for market capitalization value.
8. See infra note 163.
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ing that the high costs of evaluating companies, combined with the low
probability of success for competing bidders, discourages competitive bids.
Part IV also presents new empirical evidence regarding Baird and
Rasmussen's claim that going-concern sales have in fact replaced reorganiza-
tions. Although the numbers and proportions of bankruptcy going-concern
sales had been increasing at the time Baird and Rasmussen first made their
claims in 2002, those numbers and proportions have decreased sharply in the
past two years.
I. THE SALE VERSUS REORGANIZATION DEBATE
Bankruptcy offers three alternatives for addressing the problems of a
large public company in financial distress. The debtor may reorganize the
business, sell it as a going concern, or close the business and sell the assets
piecemeal. Scholars and policymakers are in agreement that piecemeal sales
are the least desirable alternative because they provide the lowest values.9
Until recently, scholars and policymakers were also in agreement that mar-
kets were inadequate to support going-concern sales of bankrupt large
public companies, leaving reorganization as the only practical alternative.' °
In the mid-1980s, however, Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson each
challenged that view. Baird merely raised the issue of whether going-
concern sales were capable of replacing reorganization.' Jackson flatly as-
serted that they were.1
2
9. Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note 3, at 69 ("Bankruptcy scholars
for years have viewed the choices facing a corporation as either to reorganize consensually in order
to preserve going-concern value or have its assets sold piece by piece for a fraction of their value*").
The legislative history of the current Bankruptcy Code takes an equally dismal view of piecemeal
liquidation:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a
business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its
creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is
that assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more
valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
10. Until recently, going-concern sales of companies were not even considered among the
alternatives. See, e.g., supra note 9.
11. Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127, 128 (1986) [hereinafter Baird, Uneasy Case] ("In this paper I ask whether corporate reorgani-
zations should exist at all."). Baird explains as follows:
The question is ... whether [third parties] are so apt to undervalue a firm's value or so apt to
find the valuation process itself costly that they are likely to be unwilling to pay an amount that
is at least equal to the value of the firm in the hands of the existing investors.
Id. at 136; see also Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 653
(1993) [hereinafter Baird, Revisiting Auctions] ("The case for mandatory auctions is hard to make
precisely because it depends crucially on a new player entering the picture who does not exist
now.").
12. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 223 (1986) ("There
is no reason why chapter 7 could not be used as the vehicle to sell the firm as a going concern in the
same way that companies go public.").
October 2007]
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To be effective, a sale or reorganization must, directly or indirectly, solve
three problems of the bankrupt business: lack of operating profits, excessive
debt, and illiquidity. A business lacks operating profit when its revenues are
insufficient to cover the noninterest expenses of continued operation. Neither
sale nor reorganization can directly affect a company's lack of operating prof-
its. But if a debtor could either reduce its debt burden or ease its illiquidity,
that might free up resources to address operating profits.
The next Sections explain how reorganization and sale can each solve the
problems of excessive debt and illiquidity. The principal difference between
the two methods is that in a reorganization, a judge, rather than the market,
determines the debtor's valuation. Law and economics scholars generally pre-
fer sales because they consider market valuations more accurate.
A. Reorganization
Reorganization addresses the problem of excessive debt by reducing the
amount that the debtor owes. To illustrate, assume that a business with fu-
ture annual revenues of ten faces future interest expense of eight and other
expenses of four. With total annual expenses of twelve, this business will
suffer a loss of two each year. Unless something changes, the business will
eventually fail as unpaid debts accumulate and unpaid creditors seek legal
remedies.
If, however, reorganization reduces the debt of this business by half, in-
terest expense also drops by half-to four. With revenues of ten, interest
expense of four, and other expenses of four, the business will have profits of
two and can operate indefinitely. That is the essence of reorganization.
To reduce the rights of creditors while leaving the rights of shareholders
intact would violate the basic legal principle of "absolute priority." That
principle holds that a debtor must provide for full payment to creditors be-
fore making any payment at all to shareholders. 4 Much ink has been spilled
explaining the importance of absolute priority and the adverse consequences
of deviating from it. 5
13. E.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504 (1913).
14. The absolute priority rule is reflected in state statutes prohibiting the payment of divi-
dends to shareholders that would render the company unable to pay the full amount of its
obligations to shareholders. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §6.40 (2005) ("No distribution may
be made if, after giving it effect: (1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they be-
come due in the usual course of business; or (2) the corporation's total assets would be less
than ... its total liabilities....").
15. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of
the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 740 (1988) (considering whether adverse conse-
quences flow from allowing a creditor entitled to payment under the absolute priority rule to give
part of its recovery to one subordinate party with no entitlement while freezing out a more senior
party with no entitlement); Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bank-
ruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1991) (considering whether the new value exception
is harmful to the absolute priority rule's purposes). But see Douglas G. Baird & Donald S.
Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J.
1930, 1935 (2006) (arguing that difficulty of appraisal, not lack of commitment to the absolute
priority rule, is the cause of many if not most deviations from absolute priority).
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Reorganization law enforces the absolute priority rule by requiring
shareholders to surrender to creditors that portion of the shareholders' own-
ership necessary to compensate the creditors for the debt reduction. If the
company's debts exceed the total value of its assets, the absolute priority
rule requires the surrender of all shares. 6 The creditors become the com-
pany's owners. This process is referred to as the conversion of debt to
equity. Conversion of debt to equity has long been the principal technique
for the reorganization of large public companies.
Such conversions require valuations. To see why, reconsider the debtor
with revenues of ten, interest expense of eight, and other expenses of four.
Assume additionally that the amount this debtor owes is eighty and that, in
reorganization, the debt is cancelled entirely. Interest expense drops to zero,
and the company has profits of six each period. The company is saved, but
the shareholders must compensate the creditors by giving them stock worth
eighty.
To determine how much stock has a worth of 80, reorganization must
value the shares. 7 In this example, a determination that the future earnings
of 6 per year have a present value of 120 would also determine that the
company's shares have a total value of 120. Surrendering two-thirds of the
shares would provide creditors with value of 80 and make them whole.
Scholars in law, finance, and economics have long debated the best way
to determine a distressed company's value. Standard appraisal methods that
fix the value as some multiple of past earnings fail because distressed com-
panies' past earnings are typically negative and not fairly indicative of future
earnings. Stock and bond prices are unreliable because the companies' situa-
tions change rapidly, information flows are generally inadequate, and
trading is often suspended entirely. The most common method of valuation
employed in reorganization cases is to "discount[] future cash flows for the
reconstituted business that will emerge from Chapter 11 ... at rates reflect-
ing the business and financial risks involved."' 8
16. This aspect of the absolute priority rule is expressed in II U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B):
(2) [T~he condition that a plan be fair and equitable... includes the following requirements:
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain
on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the
plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class
will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or
interest any property ....
II U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
17. E.g., Baird & Bernstein, supra note 15, at 1935 ("Applying the absolute priority rule in
the context of a corporate reorganization requires the enterprise to be valued.").
18. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS EXECUTIVE COMM., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNT-
ANTS, STATEMENT OF POSITION 90-7: FINANCIAL REPORTING BY ENTITIES IN REORGANIZATION
UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (1990) [hereinafter SOP 90-7], reprinted in 2 AM. INST. OF CERTI-
FIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA TECHNICAL PRACTICE AIDS § 10,460, at 19,273 (1997).
October 20071
8 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:1
The values of those future cash flows-famously referred to as a "guess
compounded by an estimate"'9-are fixed by negotiations among the repre-
sentatives of creditors and shareholders.' ° If the parties fail to agree on a
value, the court hears the parties' evidence-typically investment bankers'
opinions regarding value-and makes the determination. That determination
is what has drawn the law and economics scholars' ire.2'
The conversion of debt into equity solves not only the excessive debt
problem but also the illiquidity problem. Illiquidity occurs when a debtor
owns valuable property but cannot obtain the money necessary to pay its
debts without selling the property for a less-than-fair price. To illustrate,
assume a corporate debtor whose future earnings prospects (the valuable
property) have a present value of $1 million. Because those earnings will be
realized only over a period of years, the debtor may be unable to pay a debt
now due in the amount of $600,000. But if reorganization converts the
$600,000 debt to stock, the debtor no longer has to pay it. After reorganiza-
tion, the old and new stockholders together will own the company. The
majority will decide when the company should pay the $600,000 (as divi-
2dends). The debtor's liquidity problem has been solved.
B. The Going-Concern Sale Alternative
In the 1980s, the sale of nonbankrupt large public companies became
commonplace. That development inspired the bankruptcy scholars of the
period to consider whether bankrupt companies could be similarly sold and,
if so, whether sale could provide a "market" alternative to judicial valuation.
Some, including Professors Thomas Jackson23 and Michael Jensen,24 leapt
directly to the conclusion that such sales were both feasible and desirable.
As Jackson explained, "the justification for chapter 11 based on undervalua-
tions by third parties is suspect, at least in a society such as our current one
with well-developed capital markets. 25
19. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 222 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6181;
Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 301,
313 n.62 (1982). Apparently, the guess is at the amounts of future earnings and the estimate is of the
appropriate discount rate.
20. SOP 90-7, supra note 18, at 19,273 ("Reorganization value and the terms of the plan are
determined only after extensive arms-length negotiations or litigation between the interested parties.
Before the negotiations, the debtor-in-possession, creditors, and equity holders develop their own
ideas on the reorganization value of the entity that will emerge from Chapter 11 ").
21. See infra text accompanying notes 34-38.
22. An alternative means for relieving the pressure on the debtor to pay would be to resched-
ule payment of the $600,000 debt to a time when the debtor can pay it. Parties use both the
conversion of debt to equity and the extension of repayment schedules in reorganization cases.
23. See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 218-24.
24. See Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. APPLIED
CoRtP. FIN., Summer 1991, at 13, 31-32 (proposing that reorganizations be eliminated and that all
bankruptcy filings lead to mandatory auctions).
25. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 219.
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If distressed companies could sell their businesses for fair prices in cash
deals, that would solve both the problems of excessive debt and of illiquid-
ity. When the grounds for such sales are present, the bankruptcy courts have
the power to authorize the sale of a debtor's business free and clear of debts,
26
including secured debts. Because the debts do not follow the business, they
cannot impair its future operations. The buyer pays the purchase price in
cash, solving the debtor's illiquidity problem. Cash in an amount equal to
the full value of the company is immediately available for the payment of
debt in accord with the absolute priority rule.
Scholars who argue for such sales generally assume that the buyer is
also sufficiently liquid to spend whatever is necessary to address the operat-
ing profits problem. As Baird and Rasmussen put it, "The ability to sell
entire firms and divisions eliminates the need for a collective forum in
which the different players must come to an agreement about what should
happen to the assets. That decision can be left to the new owners.
'27
What going-concern-sale advocates missed, however, was the fact that
anyone capable of supplying the extraordinary amounts of market liquidity
needed to buy and rehabilitate large public companies would demand a sub-
stantial return on investment. The advantage of reorganization was that it
eliminated the need to pay that return on investment.
Many sale advocates recognized that the assumption of virtually free,
virtually unlimited market liquidity was unrealistic. In articles published in
1986 and 1993, Professor Baird stopped short of claiming that distressed
28
companies could routinely be sold at auction for market values. Specifi-
cally, he doubted that a sufficient number of third parties would attend the
sales and bid. As Baird put it, "The case for mandatory auctions is hard to
make precisely because it depends crucially on a new player entering the
picture who does not exist now.
' 29
Others shared Baird's doubts about the assumed market for distressed
large public companies, but were nevertheless determined to invent ways of
bringing markets to bear. Mark Roe;3° Barry Adler and Ian Ayres;3' and
26. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b)(1), (f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (authorizing trustees to sell
assets free and clear of liens outside the ordinary course of business "after notice and a hearing").
27. Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 756. See also Donald S. Bernstein,
U.S. Chapter /1 Today: A Funny Thing Happened On the Way to the Courthouse, in GLOBAL LEGAL
GROUP, THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: CORPORATE RECOVERY AND INSOL-
VENCY 2007, at 5, 6 (2007), http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/1215.pdf. ("The
breadth and depth of today's M&A and financing markets means the size of the distressed business
no longer operates as a constraint on sale ... [and] buyers have become less likely to impose an
'insolvency' discount in connection with such a sale.").
28. Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note I1, at 653; Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at
147 ("This paper has suggested that the premise underlying Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code may
be unsound.") (emphasis added).
29. Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note 11, at 653.
30. Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 559 (1983) (proposing that bankruptcy courts value reorganizing firms by offer-
ing 10% of their shares in public markets and extrapolating the value obtained to the remaining 90%).
31. Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in Bank-
ruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83, 101-03 (2001) (proposing that the bankruptcy courts value reorganizing
October 20071
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Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore32 each floated hybrid
schemes for market-based reform. Each of the schemes was market-based in
that bidders, rather than judges, determined values. Each was hybrid in that
it preserved reorganization's method for dealing with the problem of liquid-
ity. That method was to force at least some creditors to remain invested in
the bankrupt firm.
Sale proponents seemed to concede that the costs of sales would be at
least as high as the costs of reorganization." But they were virtually unani-
mous in arguing that market valuation was preferable to bankruptcy judge
valuation because the market would be more accurate. Thus, Mark Roe
charged that "[t]he bankruptcy court is unlikely to make an astute independent
determination of... the firm's value .... Bankruptcy courts lack substantial
financial expertise; they are judges, not investment bankers." 4 Michael Jensen
added that "bankruptcy judges ... have neither the information nor the exper-
tise to assess the firm's value., 35 Thomas Jackson noted that "there is likely to
be a cost to valuations by a bankruptcy judge that is not present in market-
place valuations. Substantial evidence suggests that valuations by
bankruptcy judges are systematically too high. 36 Douglas Baird explained
that a "bankruptcy judge may be less able to cast a cold eye on an enterprise
and make tough decisions than someone who has put his own money on the
line."37 Barry Adler and Ian Ayres concluded that "[n]ot only do judges lack
the business expertise of individual capital investors, but also a judicial
valuation cannot benefit from the collective wisdom of market investors in
the aggregate. 38
Our findings indicate precisely the opposite. The judicially-based valua-
tions in reorganization cases were surprisingly accurate predictions of
postreorganization trading values. The market valuations in sale cases ap-
peared to average less than half of what the companies were actually
worth.
39
firms by requiring claimants to submit their personal supply and demand schedules for all quantities
of securities that might be issued and then determining the point or points at which the markets
would clear).
32. Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 861-63 (1994) (proposing that the bankruptcy courts value reorganizing firms
by soliciting both cash and noncash bids for the companies, and allowing the claimants to choose
among them by majority vote).
33. E.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 468
n.128 (1992) (citing data suggesting that the expense of the auctions would exceed the expense of
reorganization); Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note 1I, at 642 (comparing elements of cost for
reorganization and liquidation). Baird concludes that "[o]nce all this is taken into account, it is hard
to support the case for mandatory auctions [in Chapter 11] on the basis of the direct costs of bank-
ruptcy." Id.
34. Roe, supra note 30, at 547.
35. Jensen, supra note 24, at 31.
36. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 220.
37. Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 137.
38. Adler & Ayres, supra note 31, at 90.
39. See infra Section HI.A. 1.
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The scholars also portrayed the judges' roles in reorganization valua-
tions as larger than they were. First, in a substantial majority of large public
company bankruptcies, the reorganization value of the company was fixed
not by the judge but by the opposing parties in negotiations. If those parties
negotiated in the shadow of systematically biased judicial decisions-as
Jackson charged-the scholars' complaint might have been valid. But the
"evidence" 40 Jackson cited for his charge of systematic overvaluation was
virtually nonexistent.4 ' Since Jackson wrote, ours is the third study to show
that fresh-start reorganization values are slightly lower than the values the
42market placed on the same firms in postconfirmation trading. In our study,
we found that reorganization values were, on average, 12% lower than post-
confirmation market values. Thus, well-informed negotiators would have no
reason to believe that judges' valuations would be "systematically" higher
than postconfirmation market values.43
Second, in the few instances when judges value companies, they do not
rely on their personal expertise. They listen to the testimony of investment
bankers regarding value. Those witnesses are the same investment bankers
who advise private investors what to bid or ask in sale scenarios.
Although reorganization's detractors had not shown that remedy to be
inadequate, they focused on whether going-concern sales could provide a
substitute.
C. The Market for Large Public Companies
Historically, bankruptcy lawyers and judges expressed doubt that capi-
tal markets were good enough to replace reorganizations. In a study of
40. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 220 ("Substantial evidence suggests that valuations by bank-
ruptcy judges are systematically too high.").
41. Id. at 220 n.36. Jackson's "evidence" was primarily the opinions of two law professors
that the securities issued in reorganization cases would not immediately sell for the reorganization
values assigned to them. Blum seemed to think that the market value was correct and reorganization
value in error, referring to "the inflation of reorganization value to exceed market value'" Walter J.
Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565, 578 n.18
(1950). Brudney seemed to think reorganization value was correct and the market in error, arguing
that issuance of securities to senior claimants that had an immediate market value equal to their
claims "would measure the pay-out in the depressed liquidation values which the reorganization
process is designed to avoid." Victor Brudney, The Investment- Value Doctrine and Corporate Read-
justments, 72 HARv. L. REv. 645, 679 (1959). Our finding that reorganization values are in fact
higher than sale values suggests that Brudney's conceptualization is more accurate than Blum's and
Jackson's.
42. See Stuart C. Gilson, Edith S. Hotchkiss, & Richard S. Ruback, Valuation of Bankrupt
Firms, 13 REv. FIN. STUD. 43, 54 tbl.2, 55 (2000) (finding a mean difference in fresh start valuation
from market value of -4.7% in a sample of twenty-eight cases); Reuven Lehavy, Reporting Discretion
and the Choice of Fresh Start Values in Companies Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 7 REV.
ACCT. STUD. 53, 54 (2002) ("Using the market value of equity immediately after emergence from
Chapter II as a measure of a firm's intrinsic value, I find that the fresh start equity value is, on average,
understated by about 4% and that the average absolute difference between the fresh start and market
values is about 11%"). We found that the fresh-start value was, on average, understated by about 11%,
and that the average absolute difference between fresh-start and market values is about 18%.
43. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 220.
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reorganizations completed in the 1980s, LoPucki and Whitford elaborated
on this skepticism:
Several of our [bankruptcy attorney] interviewees expressed the view that
capital markets are not sufficiently developed to produce enough bidders to
ensure that the winning bid will approximate the going concern value of
the firm .... Sizeable businesses were sold in many of our cases, but none
of the purchases were financed through an initial public offering. The suc-
cessful bidder was, in every instance, an already existing firm, usually one
in the same line of business. This suggests that for most large businesses,
only a limited number of potential buyers exists."
Bankruptcy judge Samuel Bufford put the case more bluntly, stating that
"[d]ebtors need an opportunity to suspend the rights of creditors because
markets are so inefficient" and that "[b]ankruptcy is overwhelmingly a result
of imperfect markets and high transaction costs.
45
In the 1990s, changes in bankruptcy practice and economic ideology
combined to increase both the parties' preferences for sales and the likeli-
hood that bankruptcy courts would approve sales. The change in bankruptcy
practice was that the bankruptcy courts began competing for big cases. The
change in economic ideology was a growth in the influence of law and eco-
nomics among judges, bankruptcy professionals, and opinion makers more
generally.
The Delaware bankruptcy court triggered the court competition in the
early 1990s. 46 Historical accident had given bankrupt large public companies
the right to file in any bankruptcy court they chose.47 Beginning in 1990, the
Delaware bankruptcy court adopted a variety of practices that appealed to
the "case placers"-the lawyers, executives, and DIP lenders who choose
courts for bankrupt companies. 48 By 1996, the Delaware bankruptcy court
had a near-national monopoly on large public company bankruptcies, at-
tracting thirteen of the fifteen such cases filed that year (87%). 49 In the late
1990s, other courts responded by copying many of Delaware's practices,
thus joining in the competition. °
One practice widely adopted by competing courts was to permit sale of
the debtor's business as a going concern under section 363 of the Bank-
44. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 763-64 (1993) (foot-
notes omitted).
45. Samuel L. Bufford, What is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 846 (1994). See also Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange isions in a Strange World:
A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79, 100 (1992) ("Chapter 11
addresses the deficiencies of the marketplace by offering the owners, and more importantly the
creditors, an alternative to putting the debtor's assets on the auction block.").
46. LYNN M. LoPucto, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES Is COR-
RUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 49-76 (2005).
47. Id. at 15-16.
48. Id. at 49-68.
49. Id. at 49-50.
50. Id. at 123-35.
[Vol. 106:1
Bankruptcy Fire Sales
ruptcy Code.5' Prior to the competition, courts had required "good business
52
reason[s]" for selling a company without plan formalities and disclosures.
Routine section 363 sale approval appealed to case placers because it was
essentially an option for them to sell the company. If they chose to exercise
the sale option, they could sell on short notice, without giving creditors ei-
ther the opportunity to vote or the extensive disclosure statement required byS53
reorganization law in connection with voting. Most section 363 sales were
of doubtful legality.5 4 But if a court refused to permit them, the case placers
simply took their business elsewhere.
The competitive pressures on the bankruptcy courts to permit section
363 sales coincided with a growing national faith in the efficiency of mar-
kets." In 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed what amounted to a
preference for sale over reorganization. The Court complained that in reor-
ganization "any determination that the price [of a bankrupt company] was
top dollar would necessarily be made by a judge in bankruptcy court,
whereas the best way to determine value is exposure to a market. '5 6
In combination, these pressures from court competition and promarket
ideology reached such an extreme that when managers sought to sell their
companies, some courts refused to hear evidence that the companies could
be worth more than the sale prices. In the Polaroid bankruptcy, for example,
managers sought confirmation of a sale for approximately a third of the
company's book value. The sale price was widely criticized in the financial
press as inadequate." The creditors' committee objected to the sale and
sought to show that the company was worth more in reorganization. The
presiding Delaware judge, Peter J. Walsh, refused even to take the commit-
tee's evidence into account:
[The principal] conflict here is between those persons and entities who
preach and believe that there must be some valuation done which would
51. Id. at 167-80.
52. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071
(2d Cir. 1983); Elizabeth B. Rose, Comment, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(B): the Opportunity
for Sweetheart Deals Without Chapter I/ Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 263-68
(2006) (reviewing the case law).
53. 11 U.S.C. § I 125(a)(1) requires that the plan proponent furnish the following:
[lI]nformation of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable ... includ-
ing a discussion of the potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the debtor,
any successor to the debtor, and to a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or
interests in the case, that would enable such a hypothetical investor of the relevant class to
make an informed judgment about the plan.
II U.S.C.A. § I 125(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
54. LoPucKI, supra note 46, at 167-69.
55. Id. at 233-34.
56. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 457
(1999) (citing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 262 (rev. ed. 1993)).
57. See, e.g., Kris Frieswick, What's Wrong With This Picture?, CFO, Jan. 2003, at 40; Tom
Becker & Lingling Wei, Questions Mount In Chapter 1) Case of Former Polaroid, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, Jan. 28, 2003 (on file with author).
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demonstrate that this enterprise is [not] worth more than what is being
proposed by the proposed transaction.... I have never accepted the propo-
sition that the Court should be guided by valuation when a sale transaction,
and in many of these cases, including this one, an appropriately shopped
sales transaction is the alternative. And even in this case where the dispar-
ity is dramatic, to say the least, I think the fundamental proposition, which
this Court has fought for a lot of years, is that a transaction appropriately
conducted is the better test of value .... I favor the market test approach
and that was done in this case."
By approving the sale, Judge Walsh in effect took judicial notice that a large
public company could be worth no more in reorganization than was bid at
an "appropriately conducted" auction sale.
In the 1990s, section 363 sales of large public companies grew from a
trickle to a flood.5 9 Sales under confirmed plans were also on the increase.
6
0
Baird and Rasmussen noted the increasing numbers and interpreted them
not as the result of court competition combined with a shift in ideology but
rather as the result of an improvement in the market for large public compa-
nies. It was in that context they announced that "[c]orporate reorganizations
have all but disappeared.'
To Baird and Rasmussen, the growing number of companies that chose
sale over reorganization proved sale's victory over reorganization in the
marketplace and the lack of any need for a reorganization alternative. Baird
and Rasmussen are skeptical that the distressed companies that file bank-
ruptcy have much going-concern value. But to the extent the companies do
have going-concem value, Baird and Rasmussen argue that going-concern
sales now capture that value:
In examining the nature of the change in the large corporate Chapter I ls of
2002, we see that fundamental forces at work in the economy have made
the traditional reorganization increasingly obsolete. Railroads had enor-
mous going-concern value and incoherent capital structures, while facing
primitive capital markets. Today's businesses can be replicated with virtual
businesses that organize production through the marketplace over the
Internet. Any going-concern surplus can be captured for creditors via a
sale.62
The study we present here was designed to test empirically Baird and
Rasmussen's assertion that "[t]he days when reorganization law promised
58. Transcript of Sale Hearing Before Honorable Peter J. Walsh United States Chief Bank-
ruptcy Judge at 172-73, 177, In re Polaroid Corp., No. 01-10864 (Bankr. D. Del. July 3, 2002).
59. See LoPucKi, supra note 46, at 170-71 (showing only three section 363 sales of large
public companies in the decade of the 1980s, as compared with fifty-two in the four year period
2000-03).
60. See Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter I I at Twilight, supra note 3, at 675-78.
61. Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 751.
62. Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note 3, at 699.
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substantial benefits are gone" 63 by comparing the actual outcomes of sale
and reorganization cases.
D. Prior Empirical Evidence
To date, no direct empirical evidence exists comparing going-concern
sale values with reorganization values. A study of the Japanese bankruptcy
system compared official estimates of piecemeal sale value with reorganiza-
tion value.64 Studies of the Swedish bankruptcy system have compared
61
official estimates of piecemeal sale value with going-concern sale value.
But this Article is the first to report an empirical study comparing going-
concern sale value with reorganization value.
II. METHODOLOGY
We studied large public companies. Scholars generally agree that sale
prices are most likely to compare well with reorganization values for com-
panies that are large and publicly traded.66 Information regarding large
public companies is more readily available to prospective buyers, and the
61market for public companies' shares is already developed.
A. Sample Selection
We drew samples of thirty section 363 sale cases and thirty reorganiza-
tion cases from Lynn LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database ("BRD").68
63. Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 789.
64. Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11 ? The Evidence
From Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111 (1994).
65. E.g., Per Stromberg, Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions:
Theory and Tests, 55 J. FIN. 2641 (2000); B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorbum, Automatic bank-
ruptcy auctions and fire-sales (February 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors)
[hereinafter Eckbo & Thorburn, Fire Sales] ("Fire-sale discounts exist when the auction leads to
piecemeal liquidation, but not when the bankrupt firm is acquired as a going concern."); B. Espen
Eckbo & Karin S. Thorbum, Bidding in mandatory bankruptcy auctions: Theory and evidence (Feb-
ruary 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
66. Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note 11, at 637 ("The case for the mandatory auction is
easiest when the firm in question is publicly traded."); Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 1I, at 128
("[T]he entire law of corporate reorganizations is hard to justify under any set of facts and virtually
impossible when the debtor is a publicly held corporation."); Robert K. Rasmussen & David A.
Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85,
109 (1995) ("[A]uctions work best with a publicly traded firm."); Roe, supra note 30, at 563
("[Bankruptcy institutions] have failed to make necessary distinctions between the market faced by a
publicly held firm with widely distributed securities and that faced by a bankrupt local barber shop,
for example. The market for the former could be effective even if the market for the latter often is
not.").
67. See supra note 66.
68. Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu (last vis-
ited May 14, 2007). Some may consider these sample sizes small. The proper measure of whether
the sample size is adequate for empirical research, however, is whether it is the appropriate size to
yield statistically significant results given the expected magnitude of the effect under investigation.
In other words, a large sample is needed to detect small effects, and a small sample is needed to
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That database includes all large public company bankruptcies filed in the
United States since the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code, October 1,
1979. For our section 363 sale case sample, we chose the most recent cases
available as of the time of data collection and then worked back in time until
we reached our preset goal of thirty cases. The earliest sales included were
in December 2000. The latest were in April 2004. For that period, we in-
cluded substantially every case in which (1) the debtor sold all or
substantially all of its assets pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code, (2) the debtor indicated the amount of its total assets on Exhibit A to
the Petition, 69 and (3) the PACER file included sufficient information to sup-
port calculation of a sale price. The sales studied were thirty of the fifty-one
sales occurring during that period (59%).70
With one exception,7 we chose cases without advance knowledge of the
sale prices. Once we began work on a case, we pursued it to final valuation
or proof that such a valuation was impossible. Thus, we think our sample,
though not quite the universe of qualifying cases for the period studied, is
unbiased within that universe.
Although we examined thirty sale cases, our findings with respect to go-
ing-concern sales are based on only twenty-four of them. In five of the
remaining cases, the debtor's business was not operating at the time of the
sale. We excluded these cases from our comparison because legal scholars
generally assume that such piecemeal sales of assets occur at prices well
72below reorganization values. Our focus is on comparing going-concern
sale prices with reorganization values.
In the final sale case that we excluded from our going-concern sale find-
ings, the debtor's bankruptcy resulted from managerial fraud. We excluded
all fraud cases from our sale and reorganization samples because we con-
sider the values on Exhibit A in fraud cases too unreliable to serve as the
control in making our comparison.73 Because we actually processed the
fraud sale case-In re Impath Inc. 74 -before excluding it,75 we know that its
detect large effects. By that measure, our sample size is clearly adequate with respect to the issue of
whether sale recoveries are lower than reorganization recoveries.
69. If the debtor did not list its total assets on Exhibit A, we lacked a book-asset value by
which to measure the recovery.
70. We omitted thirteen cases because the debtor did not file an Exhibit A indicating the
book value of its assets. We omitted eight cases because the PACER files contained information
insufficient to calculate a sale price.
71. We did know the sale price in In re Polaroid Corp., No. 01-10864 (Bankr. D. Del. filed
Oct. 12, 2001), before selecting it for our study, but virtually any method of sample selection would
have included it.
72. Appendix A-1 shows the relationship between recoveries in piecemeal and going-
concern sales.
73. The division of cases into "fraud" and "not fraud" was made by the classifications in
Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database. See LoPucki, supra note 68. Those classifica-
tions were all made by LoPucki prior to our decision to use them.
74. No. 03-16113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 28, 2003).
75. In deciding to exclude fraud cases, we assumed that the frauds were accounting frauds
that would result in the overstatement of asset values at the time of filing and thus cause under-
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exclusion made no difference in our findings. 6 We did not process the fraud
reorganization cases, so we do not know whether their exclusion made any
difference.
We drew the reorganization case sample after completing our analysis of
the sale cases. A case was eligible for inclusion in the reorganization case
sample if (1) the debtor confirmed a plan of reorganization during the period
2000 through 2004, (2) the debtor emerged from bankruptcy as a going
concern and filed an annual report (form 10-K) with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission after confirmation,7 s (3) the debtor elected fresh-start
accounting at the conclusion of its case, 79 and (4) the debtor's bankruptcy
was not principally the result of fraud, as indicated in the BRD. s° Fifty-two
cases met these criteria.
We arranged the list of fifty-two cases alphabetically. One of our re-
search assistants processed cases from the top of this list; the other
processed cases from the bottom. They worked until they had processed a
total of thirty cases. Because we can think of no reason why cases with
names in the middle of the alphabet would differ from cases at either end,
we also consider this sample to be unbiased within our criteria.
Our samples may not be representative of large public company sale
and reorganization cases in several respects. First, the sale cases included
only sales under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Sales under con-
firmed plans were excluded. One might suppose that sales under
confirmed plans would bring better prices because the properties are ex-
posed to the market for longer periods, because more information is
disclosed to creditors and prospective purchasers, or because greater dis-
closure deters fraud and self-dealing. On the other hand, the prefiling
statements of sale and reorganization recoveries. Thus we assumed that we were removing the low-
est sale and reorganization recovery ratios. The one sale fraud case excluded involved the expected
type of fraud: an overstatement of the value of the company's assets. Impath, Inc., Current Report
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 8-K) (July 30, 2003)
(reporting that Impath's Audit Committee had initiated an investigation into the possibility that
accounts receivable had been overstated and another asset carried at an inappropriate value);
Bloomberg News, Sentence in hnpath Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at C6 (stating that the
former president and former CEO of Impath had both been convicted of securities fraud). In the six
months prior to filing, Impath wrote its assets down by nearly 50%. It then sold those assets for
123% of reduced value, by far the highest recovery ratio in a sale case. We decided to deal with this
conundrum by making our calculations with and without Impath and reporting any significant dif-
ferences resulting from Impath's exclusion.
76. Adding Impath to the final regression model (Table 1, Model V) does not substantively
change the coefficients or p-values. The R-square changes by less than .005.
77. The years 2000 through 2004 are the same years covered by the sale case sample.
78. These criteria exclude cases in which debtors sold their assets under a plan of reorganiza-
tion. We consider such cases to be sale/reorganization hybrids. The criteria also exclude cases in
which the debtors emerged as private companies. We could not have valued the latter group because
we would not have access to either fresh-start or stock sale data.
79. This criterion assured that we would be able to calculate fresh-start values in all cases.
80. We concluded that the book-asset values reported on Exhibit A in fraud cases were not
sufficiently reliable. One fraud case, involving Impath Inc., was included in the sale case sample
before we recognized the problem. We excluded Impath when comparing the sale and reorganiza-
tion samples, but the exclusion had no significant impact on our results.
October 2007]
Michigan Law Review
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization ("EBITDA");
earnings before interest and taxes ("EBIT"); and net income of the compa-
nies selling under confirmed plans were each, on average, lower than those
of the section 363 sale companies." That suggests sale prices under con-
firmed plans would also have been lower." We are left with no substantial
reason for believing that sale recoveries would have been closer to reorgani-
zation recoveries if we had included sales of going concerns under
confirmed plans.
Neither Baird and Rasmussen, nor other scholars, have expressly distin-
guished between section 363 sales and confirmed plan sales in their
endorsements of sale over reorganization. Scholars generally consider sec-
tion 363 sales at least as effective as confirmed plan sales:
Baird and Rasmussen make a valid point regarding the prevalence of sec-
tion 363(b) sales in the twenty-first century. An increasingly large number
of articles praise the benefits and popularity of these sales, with law firms
and financial groups urging clients to pursue them whenever possible. The
examples of successful sales have become too numerous to detail, and it
appears that these sales will continue to grow in popularity as an alterna-
live to selling assets under a Chapter 11 reorganization.
Thus, we think our examination of section 363 going-concern sales does
directly address the asserted benefits of going-concern sales generally.
A second reason our samples may not be representative of all sale and
reorganization cases is that our samples are drawn from a single, recent pe-
riod (2000-04). Sales and reorganizations prior to that period or subsequent
to it may differ.84
The reorganization cases in our sample may not be entirely representa-
tive because they include only companies that elected fresh-start accounting
upon emergence. The small minority of emerging companies that did not elect
fresh-start accounting may differ. This restriction probably excluded princi-
81. The differences were not statistically significant.
82. Plan sales may bring lower prices because they include a larger proportion of piecemeal
sales. Entries in the NameEmerging and AfterEmerging fields of the Bankruptcy Research Database
for the 80 companies that confirmed plans but did not emerge mention "liquidation" far more fre-
quently than "merger" or "acquisition." Those fields generally reflect the terms that the parties used.
83. Jason Brege, Note, An Efficiency Model of Section 363(b) Sales, 92 VA. L. REV. 1639
(2006). The praise for section 363 sales has, however, been far from unanimous. See, e.g., George
W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 111 (2004) ("[Section 363 sales
are] a massive, federally funded, unified foreclosure system for corporate lenders that primarily
serves the interests of secured creditors and their assistants-insiders and the insolvency profession-
als at the center of the case."). Other examples of praise for section 363 sales include Bernstein,
supra note 27, at 6 ("It was once believed that some insolvent enterprises would be difficult to sell
for full value.. . . The breadth and depth of today's M&A and financing markets means the size of
the distressed business no longer operates as a constraint on sale...."); Rose, supra note 52, at 283
("The benefits offered to debtors through § 363 sales are too alluring to expect a decrease in its
abuse without action.").
84. Only seventy-seven large public companies have been sold in section 363 sales since
October 1, 1979, the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code. Fifty-one of those sales (66%) occurred




pally solvent companies, leaving weaker reorganizing companies in our
sample.85 Thus, the restriction tended to bias the results against our thesis.
Lastly, our reorganization sample included only companies that emerged
as public companies. Companies that emerged as private companies may
differ.
B. Research Design
We initially sought to compare the recoveries in thirty liquidation cases
with the recoveries in thirty reorganization cases. The "recovery" in a case is
the percentage of firm value realized by liquidation or reorganization. We
use "total assets" as reported on Exhibit A to the bankruptcy petition as a
86proxy for firm value. Exhibit A implies that the asset figure furnished
should be a book-accounting figure, but does not expressly require it.1
7
The book value of a firm is often substantially different from the firm's
intrinsic value. But our design does not depend upon book value to accu-
rately reflect intrinsic value for particular firms. Rather, it is sufficient for
our design if the average relationship between book value and intrinsic
value, whatever it may be, is the same for our sample of sale cases as for our
sample of reorganization cases, or differs solely as a result of factors for
which we could control. The principal such factor is the firm's earnings.
We refer to the amount realized from liquidation as the "recovery." The
recovery is the implicit value the sale price placed on the assets the debtor
owned at filing. We gathered data regarding the recovery from a variety of
sources. The principal source was the asset purchase agreements available in
85. The rule governing fresh-start election that was in effect during the period covered by
our study provided as follows:
If the reorganization value of the assets of the emerging entity immediately before the date of
confirmation is less than the total of all postpetition liabilities and allowed claims, and if hold-
ers of existing voting shares immediately before confirmation receive less than 50 percent of
the voting shares of the emerging entity, the entity should adopt fresh-start reporting upon its
emergence from Chapter 11. The loss of control contemplated by the plan must be substantive
and not temporary.
SOP 90-7, supra note 18, at 19,277.
86. Exhibit A of Bankruptcy Form B I provides as follows:
If debtor is required to file periodic reports (e.g., forms 10K and 10Q) with the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and is requesting relief under chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code, this Exhibit "A" shall be
completed and attached to the petition.
Bankr. Forms Manual, Form B I, Exh.A (9/97), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Revised-Rules-and_
Forms/exhibita.pdf.
87. The specific request that elicited the assets and liability figures read as follows:
2. The following financial data is the latest available information and refers to the debtor's
condition on _ .
a. Total assets $_ ,
b. Total debts (including debts listed in 2.c., below) $
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the court files. We also examined the transcripts of the hearings on motions
to approve sales, news accounts of the sales, and Mergerstat Review sale
reports." To calculate the recovery from the nominal sale price, we added
liabilities assumed by the buyers to the cash and other consideration paid by
the buyers. If the consideration paid included securities, we valued the secu-
rities at market prices. If market prices were not available, we used the
values asserted by the parties to the transactions.
In some cases, a single debtor disposed of its assets in multiple sales. If
we were able to obtain information on all substantial sales, we calculated
the recovery as the total price received for all of the assets. In some cases,
this was the total of all of the sales. In others, the consideration received in
an early sale was sold in a later sale. 9 In such a case, we omitted the consid-
eration received in the early sale and included only that received in the later
sale.
If the debtor borrowed money during the case on a DIP loan, but did not
pay it back prior to the sale, we deducted it in the recovery calculation. Our
goal was to determine the value the buyer and seller placed on the assets the
debtor owned at the time it filed Exhibit A. We did not adjust for ordinary
operating profits and losses during the bankruptcy case, reasoning that those
amounts should be part of a valid comparison of the two means of realizing
value from the underlying assets. That is, we treated profits and losses dur-
ing the sale or reorganization case as endogenous to the procedure chosen.
For each reorganization case, we calculated the recovery two ways. The
first was based on the fresh-start accounting value the debtor assigned to its
assets upon emergence. An emerging company's accountants determine the
fresh-start accounting value of the assets of the emerging company as of the
confirmation date of the plan. 9° The accepted accounting practice is to set
the fresh-start accounting value on the basis of the "reorganization value."
The reorganization value is the value the plan negotiators placed on the
emerging company, or if the negotiators did not reach agreement as to a
88. Mergerstat Review is a database of mergers and acquisitions activity maintained by
FactSet Research Systems, Inc. It is available online at http://www.mergerstat.com. To determine
whether we could rely on Mergerstat Review sale reports to the exclusion of other sources, we com-
pared several of those reports with our own detailed analyses of the sales. We concluded that the
Mergerstat Review sale reports were not adequate for our purposes because they were, at bottom,
calculations of deal size, not asset price. In some cases, Mergerstat Review ignored assumed liabili-
ties. In others, it reported numbers that seemed to us to be flatly contrary to the terms of the asset
purchase agreements. Mergerstat's numbers were sometimes higher than ours and sometimes lower.
Our comparison is available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs.
89. For example, in the Polaroid bankruptcy, the debtor sold its Identification Systems Divi-
sion for $60 million and retained the cash proceeds of the sale. Polaroid later sold all its assets,
including $200 million in cash. We counted only the final sale.
90. SOP 90-7, supra note 18, at 19,282 ("The effects of a plan should be included in the
entity's financial statements as of the date the plan is confirmed. However, inclusion should be de-
layed to a date not later than the effective date if there is a material unsatisfied condition precedent
to the plan's becoming binding ...."). We found that the fresh-start accounting date was sometimes
a date before the effective date, sometimes after the effective date, and often the same as the effec-
tive date. We made our adjustments to fresh start values accordingly.
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value, the value determined by the court.9' We obtained the fresh-start value
from the companies' postconfirmation financial statements contained in the
annual reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Anticipating that some readers will be skeptical of fresh-start values,9'
we also computed the market capitalizations of the emerging companies. We
did so by adding the amount of the reorganized company's liabilities as
shown on its financial statements as of the effective date of the plan93 to the
market value of the reorganized company's shares. We obtained the latter
value by multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the market price
on the first trading date after the plan's effective date.94
We adjusted both of these values to reflect only the assets owned when
the debtor filed Exhibit A at the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
Those adjustments included adding to reorganization value any substantial
amounts paid to creditors during the bankruptcy case and subtracting from
reorganization value any substantial amounts borrowed during the bank-
ruptcy case as DIP lending or exit financing. Such payments and borrowings
were usually reflected in the companies' disclosure statements or later fi-
nancial statements.9
In our regression analysis, we tested several measures of the strength
and value of the businesses being sold or reorganized. By controlling for
that strength and value, we sought to isolate the effect of the sale process
itself on the recovery. We drew the data for several of these measures from
91. Id. at 19,283 ("That is, assets should be recorded on the basis of reorganization
value... "). SOP 90-7 states as follows:
Reorganization value and the terms of the plan are determined only after extensive arms-length
negotiations or litigation between the interested parties.... Several methods are used to de-
termine the reorganization value; however, generally it is determined by discounting future
cash flows for the reconstituted business that will emerge from Chapter II ... at rates reflect-
ing the business and financial risks involved.
Id. at 19,273.
92. Fresh-start values are negotiated partly in the shadow of judicial valuation. Scholars
working from an economic perspective tend to have little respect for those valuations. See supra text
accompanying notes 33-38.
93. Because all of the reorganized companies studied adopted fresh-start accounting meth-
ods, all presumably complied with SOP 9-07, which states, "[e]ntities that adopt fresh-start
reporting ... should apply the following principles: ... Each liability existing at the plan confirma-
tion date, other than deferred taxes, should be stated at present values of amounts to be paid
determined at appropriate current interest rates." SOP 90-7, supra note 18, at 19,278. Thus, the
liabilities shown probably do not differ substantially from the market values of those liabilities.
Trading prices were available for few, if any, of the liabilities of the reorganized companies in the
period immediately after confirmation.
94. We obtained trading prices from CRSP-The Center for Research in Security Prices,
http://www.crsp.chicagogsb.edu/ (last visited July 14, 2007); BigCharts: Stock Charts, Screeners,
Interactive Charting and Research Tools, http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com (last visited July 14,
2007); and Eurolnvestor.co.uk-Stock search, http://www.euroinvestor.co.uk/Stock/StockSearch.
aspx?Char=a&Country=l I (last visited July 14, 2007).




Compustat96 for the year prior to the year in which the bankruptcy case was
filed.97 In seven of the sale cases, no financial statement data were available
for the year prior to filing, so we used data from the second year prior to
filing. The measures tested were (1) the ratio of net income
98 to total assets,99
(2) the ratio of EBIT'°0 to total assets, (3) the ratio of EBITDA °' to total
assets, and (4) the ratio of cash' °2 to total assets. For reasons we explain be-
low, we also compiled a postfiling EBITDA variable from monthly
operating reports filed by the companies during their bankruptcy cases.103
III. FINDINGS
We estimated two regression models. In the first, the dependent variable
was the sale or reorganization recovery ratio using the adjusted fresh-start
valuation for reorganization cases. In the second, the dependent variable was
the sale or reorganization recovery ratio using the market capitalization valua-
tion for reorganization cases. The results for these two models were similar, so
we report only the results based on the market capitalization valuation.
A. The Regression Models
The purpose of our regression analysis was to identify the determinants
of higher recoveries, and in particular to discover whether the choice be-
tween reorganization and going-concern sale was among them. We consider
an adjusted sale price or reorganization value (the "recovery") to be higher
when it is larger in relation to the book value of the debtor's assets reported
at the filing of the bankruptcy case. Accordingly, the ratio of the recovery to
the book value of the debtor's assets (the "recovery ratio") is the dependent
variable in our analysis. We use the natural log of that ratio because the ratio
is not normally distributed. Logging the variable prevents outliers from driv-
ing the results while retaining the underlying structure of the data.
96. The Compustat database, maintained by Standard & Poor's, contains fundamental company
and market information on a vast number of public companies worldwide. It is available at
http://www.compustat.com. Compustat compiles information in 350 categories, which it calls Data
Items. For a full list of the Data Items, see http://www.wooster.edu/economics/archive/cstatitems.html
(last visited July 17, 2007).
97. The debtor's fiscal year prior to the fiscal year of bankruptcy ends, on average, about six
months prior to filing. The studied sales occurred an average of seven months after filing. The
strength and value of these businesses could have changed significantly during the period from the
prior fiscal year end to the confirmation of the sale. Based, however, on subsequent empirical inves-
tigation of that possibility, we concluded that the changes that occurred did not affect our findings.
That further investigation is discussed in Part III.A. I below.
98. Net Income (Loss), Compustat Data Item 172.
99. Assets-Total/Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity-Total, Compustat Data Item 6.
100. Operating Income After Depreciation, Compustat Data Item 178.
101. Operating Income Before Depreciation, Compustat Data Item 13.
102. Cash and Short Term Investments, Compustat Data Item I.
103. The data are available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs.
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By making the recovery ratio-which includes book value-our depend-
ent variable, we have already controlled, in a rough sense, for differences in
the values of the companies sold and reorganized. But controlling for book
value alone may not be adequate, because the book value of assets might not
adequately reflect the earnings associated with those assets. To control for
differences in earnings, we added three prefiling earnings measures to the
model as independent variables, one at a time: (1) net-income-to-assets ratio,
(2) EBIT-to-assets ratio, (3) and EBITDA-to-assets ratio.
The net-income-to-assets ratio was not a significant correlate (p = .52)'0
4
of the dependent variable. The EBIT-to-assets ratio and the EBITDA-to-
assets ratio were nearly indistinguishable in the regression.
TABLE I
DETERMINANTS OF RECOVERY RATIO
Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses)
II III IV V
Prefiling EBITDA/Assets ratio 2.805" 2.208* 2.164" 2.813"* 3.007"*
natural log (1.104) (0.922) (0.840) (0.981) (0.948)
mean = 0.033 sd = 0.109
Sale -0.897*** -10.497* -9.115"* -9.685**
(0 = Reorg, 1 = Sale) (0.190) (3.462) (3.130) (2.896)
mean = 0.54
Days In -0.280* -0.299** -0.366...
natural log (0.114) (0.100) (0.088)
mean = 16.552 sd = 0.879
Days In * Sale 0.580** 0.495* 0.528**
natural log (0.205) (0.186) (0.173)
mean = 8.835 sd = 8.259
S&P 500 -0.324 -0.601
mean = 1.041 sd = 0.138 (0.566) (0.555)
Net Merger residuals 0.309* 0.332*
mean = 0.142 sd = 0.643 (0.144) (0.158)
Industry Interest Coverage 0.841t
mean = 0.426 sd = 0.157 (0.485)
Telecom -0.615*
mean = 0.18 (0.252)
Constant 0.894* 0.400** 4.298* 4.934* 6.094**
(0,122) (0.147) (1.954) (2.028) (1.780)
R-Square .13 .41 .50 .55 .63
N 49 49 49 49 49
tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
104. The p-value of a statistical analysis is the probability of a Type I Error. In plain English,
it is the probability that a finding is generated by random variation in the data. The conventional
standard for whether a result is significant is p < .05.
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That is not an unexpected finding given their high correlation with each
other (Pearson's r = .91).'05 Between the two, the EBITDA-to-assets ratio is
a slightly better predictor of the dependent variable, and so we use it in our
model (Table I, Model I). It is significant and positive, indicating that com-
panies with higher earnings have higher recovery ratios, even controlling for
the book value of assets.'06
To determine whether illiquidity might also have played a role, we
added to the model as an independent variable the debtor's cash-to-assets
ratio as of the end of its last fiscal year prior to bankruptcy. Whether or not
EBITDA was included in the model, the cash-to-assets ratio was not signifi-
cant.'0 7 Apparently, debtors who enter bankruptcy with lower cash-to-assets
ratios do not end with lower recovery ratios.
1. The Choice between Sale and Reorganization
We next tested the effect of the sale-reorganization choice on recovery
ratios. We found that debtors who reorganize have substantially higher re-
covery ratios than debtors who sell (Model II). Controlling for the
company's earnings, reorganized companies recover about 75% of their
book value, compared to a 29% recovery ratio for those that sell.'08
Whether a company is sold or reorganized explains far more of the vari-
ance in recovery ratios than do the company's earnings. The EBITDA-to-
asset ratio accounts for only 13% of the variance in the dependent variable;
adding the Sale variable increases the variance explained to 41%, thus ac-
counting for an additional 29% of the variance in the recovery ratio. The
sale-reorganization choice explains more than twice as much of the variance
in recovery ratios as do earnings.
Our Prefiling EBITDA figure for each company is from the company's
last annual reporting period ending prior to bankruptcy. In seven sale cases,
that period was not available and we used data from the prior reporting pe-
riod. About one to three years elapsed between the ends of the reporting
periods from which we took our data and the sales or reorganizations we
valued. The average elapsed time was 1.3 years for sale cases and 1.4 years
for reorganization cases.109
105. Pearson's r is a measure of the linear relationship between two variables. The statistic is
bounded by -1 and 1. If two variables are completely unrelated then r = 0. If two variables rise and
fall together then r > 0, and if one rises while the other falls then r < 0.
106. We validated the regressions in Table I by submitting each variable in the full model
(Model V) to a Monte Carlo Permutation Test with 1000 repetitions. The p-values for all variables in
the test are consistent with those reported in Table 1. All are p < .05, except the Industry Interest
Coverage variable, which is p <. 10.
107. p = .704 with EBITDA in the model, p = .203 without EBITDA in the model.
108. These ratios differ from the ratios reported in note 7 above because here we controlled
for EBITDA.
109. We compiled the variable EstDaysBefSale by assuming that all bankruptcies were filed
at the midpoint of the fiscal year. We added (1) the 180-day half year and (2) the days from the end
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To investigate the possibility that later changes in the companies' earn-
ings might account for the large difference in sale and reorganization
recoveries observed, we compiled an additional measure of earnings, the
ratio of p6stfiling EBITDA to assets ("Postfiling EBITDA/Assets"). That
measure is based on the earnings and assets reported by the companies in
the last three months prior to sale or reorganization. 0
When we substituted Postfiling EBITDA/Assets for the pre-filing meas-
ure in a regression equation similar to Model II in Table I, the Sale variable
remained by far the most significant predictor of the recovery ratio."' We
conclude that changes in the ratio of EBITDA-to-assets from the period be-
fore filing to the period immediately before sale or reorganization cannot
explain the difference in recoveries in sale and reorganization cases.
The pre- and postfiling EBITDA-to-assets-ratio variables are correlated
with each other (r = .43, p = .01). No obvious systematic differences exist
between them, and they are reasonable substitutes for each other. We use the
prefiling EBITDA-to-assets ratio in subsequent analyses because that vari-
able was calculated by a third party, exists for a larger number of cases, and
is less noisy.
2. Timing
A possible bias against the sale-to-recovery ratio is built into our de-
pendent variable. The average time elapsed between the events referenced in
the variable's denominator (bankruptcy filing) and in its numerator (sale or
reorganization) differs for sales and reorganizations. Sales occurred an aver-
age of 223 days after the filing of the bankruptcy case, while reorganizations
of the fiscal year of the last financial statement to the bankruptcy filing to (3) the days from the
bankruptcy filing to the sale order in sale cases or from the bankruptcy filing to the confirmation
order in reorganization cases.
110. The large majority of companies studied did not report annual earnings for the year
immediately prior to sale or reorganization. A large number of them did, however, file monthly
operating reports ("MORs") during their bankruptcy cases. MORs were generally available for the
three months immediately prior to the month in which the sale or reorganization occurred. Although
few of those reports presented a value specifically for EBITDA, we were usually able to calculate
one with a reasonable degree of confidence. Our goal was to track Compustat's method of calculat-
ing EBITDA. We used net sales or revenues in preference to gross sales or revenues when both were
available. From that figure we deducted cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative
expenses. If the debtors had expressly included depreciation, amortization, reorganization, restruc-
turing, or interest expenses in either of those two figures, we removed it.
In several instances, data were available for at least one month, but not for all three. In those
instances, we used the month or months available and assumed that the missing months were the
same as the months we had. In other instances, monthly data were not available, but quarterly data
were available for a period that overlapped the three month period that was the subject of our study.
In those instances, we used the quarterly data. (None of the quarterly data used included postsale or
postreorganization EBITDA.) Using these methods, we were able to calculate the ratio of annual-
ized EBITDA to assets for twenty-two sale cases and eighteen reorganization cases-in total, forty
of the sixty cases studied. The data are available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs.
Ill. The results indicate that there is no relationship between Post-filing EBITDA/Assets and
recovery (b = 0.006, p = .99). Sale remains a highly significant covariate of recovery in the regres-
sion (b = -0.66, p <.01, r2 = .20, n = 34). We interpret these findings to mean that the EBITDA-to-
assets ratio is a minor covariate of the recovery ratio in bankruptcy.
October 20071
Michigan Law Review
occurred an average of 314 days after filing. If it were true that recovery
ratios increased as the length of the bankruptcy case increased, the effect of
our variable design would have been to discriminate against sale-to-recovery
ratios. To address that possibility, we control for the difference in case
lengths by including a time variable in our model. The variable Days In is
the number of days from filing to reorganization in reorganization cases and
filing to sale order in sale cases.
We anticipated that time would affect sales and reorganizations differ-
ently. Specifically, a quick sale might bring a low price and a lingering
reorganization might reflect a company's underlying poor health. To capture
this effect we introduced the interaction term Days In*Sale. The resulting
coefficients (which should be read as a group) validate our expectations;
they suggest that the recovery ratio for a reorganized company decreases
with time in bankruptcy, but that the recovery ratio of a sold company in-
creases with time in bankruptcy (Model III). We interpret the finding with
respect to reorganizations to mean that high-recovery-ratio reorganization
cases resolve more quickly."2 We interpret the finding with respect to sales
to mean that low-recovery-ratio sale cases resolve more quickly."' Most
importantly, our findings with respect to the importance of the sale-
reorganization choice were not affected by the controls.
In reorganization cases, the distribution of cash and securities takes
place after confirmation. The same is ordinarily true in section 363 sale
cases. But the fact that section 363 sales often reduce the estates to cash
early in the cases led some commentators, including James J. White, to as-
sume that section 363 sales result in quicker payouts to creditors:
So what does [a section 363 sale] offer to the secured creditors? Well, it
gives them the same benefit that everyone else enjoys, a lower priced reor-
ganization. Part of that comes from reduced administrative fees, but more
of it comes from the shortening of the term of their non interest-bearing
loan. Presumably the ultimate payout in these cases comes sooner than in




Our data suggest that White's presumption may be wrong. In the sale
cases we studied, confirmation did not occur until an average of 611 days
112. The finding could be interpreted to mean that lingering in reorganization causes recovery
ratios to decline. We are skeptical of this interpretation because we found in another study that
longer reorganizations wcre correlated with lower refiling rates. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W.
Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1933, 1976-77 (2002).
113. The finding could be interpreted to mean that greater patience or greater ability to wait
results in sale at a higher price. We are skeptical of both these interpretations. First, for nearly all of
the companies sold, the sale process began with the hiring of a financial advisor prior to bankruptcy,
so the time from bankruptcy to sale is not a good measure of patience or ability to wait. Second, we
found no relationship between recovery and our best indicator of a debtor's ability to wait-
assertions of nonviability. See infra Section B. 1.




after the filing of the case, as compared with only 314 days for reorganiza-
tion cases."'
Delayed confirmation does not necessarily equate to delayed distribu-
tion. Probably some parties in interest, particularly secured creditors, were
paid directly from the sale proceeds upon closing of the sales. But probably
some secured creditors, most unsecured creditors, and all shareholders had
to wait for their money until plan confirmation." 6 Because the section 363
sale cases took nearly twice as long as the reorganization cases to reach plan
confirmation, it is not at all clear that, on average, payouts came sooner in
sale cases. To the extent that payouts in sale cases actually came later, the
resulting reductions in actual recoveries have not been taken into account in
our findings; the sale process performed worse than we report. Further study
is needed to determine the extent of-and reasons for-the long postsale
delays.
3. Stock Market and Merger Market Conditions
We next tested whether stock market or merger market conditions influ-
enced recoveries. We expected that higher stock prices generally would be
correlated with higher recoveries, in part because we assume the same com-
panies are worth more in higher markets, but also more specifically because
we used the stock prices of the reorganized companies as our means of valu-
ing them.' 7 Higher stock prices might also make it easier to raise the money
necessary for acquisitions and so increase sale prices.' 18
The level of merger and acquisition activity varies widely over time." 9
We hypothesized that the conditions that caused high levels of mergers and
acquisitions would lead to higher recoveries because debtors would have a
ready market for companies they wished to sell either before or after plan
confirmation. We also hypothesized that high stock prices and high levels of
mergers and acquisitions would be correlated with each other.
115. Compare infra Appendix A-2: Sale/Reorganization Comparison: Reorganization Cases,
col. 4 (averaging 314 days from filing to confirmation), with infra Appendix A-I:
Sale/Reorganization Comparison: Sale Cases, col. 6 (averaging 611 days from filing to sale).
116. With Impath, the sale proceeds were sufficient to pay all unsecured creditors in full, with
interest. The court ordered that the payment be made prior to plan confirmation, but noted the lack
of precedent for such a payment. Terry Brennan, Impath creditors to be fully paid, DAILY DEAL
(N.Y), Nov. 19, 2004 (" 'Judge Beatty said from the bench that it was unprecedented that all credi-
tors would be paid before a plan has been confirmed,' said creditors' counsel, Schuyler Carroll of
Arent Fox PLLC. 'She also said that there is no case law to support her decision.' ").
117. One who began with the belief that stock prices reflect the intrinsic values of companies
might not share our expectation. But data, not expectations, determined our findings.
118. We anticipated that this relationship might be weaker because little of the purchase price
in the sales we studied was paid in stock. On average, 71% of the sale price was paid in cash. In
only six of thirty cases (20%), did the buyer pay part of the purchase price in securities.
119. FACTSET MERGERSTAT, L.L.C., MERGERSTAT REVIEW 2 (2006) (showing that the num-




We used the Standard & Poor's 500 Index ("S&P 500")--measured at
its closing price on the day the court entered its sale order in sale cases or its
confirmation order in reorganization cases-as our measure of stock prices.
We used the number of mergers and acquisitions that occurred in the United
States in the year of the bankruptcy sale or reorganization-as reported by
Mergerstat Review-as our measure of merger and acquisition activity.1
2
0
We named the variable Net Mergers.
We assume that high stock prices are a principal cause of high levels of
mergers and acquisitions, an assumption supported by the bivariate correla-
tion (r = .56, p < .00 1). That is, the level of merger and acquisition activity
is higher when stock prices are higher. Because they are correlated with
each other, inclusion of the S&P 500 and Net Mergers variables in the same
model would result in inflated standard errors for the coefficients and lead to
invalid inferences about the relationships among the variables. To solve this
problem, we conducted a path analysis in which we regressed the S&P 500
variable on the Net Mergers variable in order to construct a new variable,
Net Merger residuals. The Net Merger residuals variable is the difference
between the S&P 500 and Net Mergers variables. It is the part of the Net
Mergers variable that is not directly correlated with the S&P 500 variable.
Thus the coefficient on this variable is a clean estimate of the effect of the
Net Mergers variable on the recovery ratio.
We find no evidence that stock prices affect recovery rates, but strong
evidence that the Net Merger residuals variable is positively correlated with
recovery rates (Model IV). We conclude that bankruptcy recoveries do not
increase when merger and acquisition activity is high as a result of high
stock prices, but do increase when merger and acquisition activity is high
for other reasons.
We think this finding, that bankruptcy recoveries are to some extent in-
dependent of stock prices, alone justifies the existence of reorganization.
Even if the recoveries from bankruptcy sales were equal to the recoveries
from reorganizations at any given time, debtors could still gain by reorganiz-
ing when conditions were not conducive to sale and then selling when those
conditions improve. If, as seems more likely, the recoveries from sales and
reorganizations vary independently over time, reorganization sometimes
provides a valuable alternative when sale conditions are poor.
4. Industry Distress
In a landmark article,"' Andrei Schleifer and Robert Vishny theorized
that bankruptcy sale prices would be depressed in distressed industries be-
120. The underlying theory is that the bankruptcy sales we observed were, in relevant re-
spects, the same kinds of transactions as the mergers and acquisitions Mergerstat Review counts.
Mergerstat Review counts "net merger and acquisition announcements." Id. at 2. The sale cases in
our study would have been counted as acquisitions. At the closing of such a sale, the usual proce-
dure is for the buyer to merge the debtor entities into a newly formed subsidiary of the buyer.
121. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market
Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (1992).
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cause the debtors' competitors-the most likely purchasers-would be illiq-
uid and so unable to bid at the sales. Our data confirm their intuition that
companies from within the debtor's industry would be the most likely pur-
chasers at bankruptcy sales. We found that two-thirds of buyers were
"strategic" in that they planned to use the assets in conjunction with their
own businesses; only one-third were "financial" investors seeking a profit
on the purchase."2
To test Schleifer and Vishny's theory with respect to the effect of indus-
try distress on sale prices, we compiled a variable to reflect the level of
distress in a debtor's industry. Following Stromberg and Eckbo and
Thorbum 121 we calculate "industry distress" as the fraction of the firms in an
industry whose income is insufficient to cover the firm's interest expense.'24
Our industry distress variable, "Industry Interest Coverage," was only mar-
ginally significant when added to the regression (Model V) and positive.
The positive coefficient indicates that when industry distress is high, recov-
ery ratios are high-the opposite of the Schleifer and Vishny hypothesis.
Consistent with our results, and contrary to Schleifer and Vishny's hypothe-
sis, the proportion of strategic buyers does not appear to vary with the level
of distress in the industry. Strategic buyers were, if anything, a little more
common when industry distress was high. '5
We doubt that industry distress causes strategic buyers to bid more for
their ailing competitors. Nor is there any substantial reason to believe that
industry distress forces debtors to reorganize rather than sell, thus producing
higher recoveries. '26 One plausible interpretation is that sick companies in
sick industries get better recoveries than sick companies in healthy indus-
tries because the problems of the former are exogenous while the problems
of the latter are endogenous. In any event, our data provide no support for
Schleifer and Vishny's theory. Regardless of the controls we employed, we
found no negative correlation between industry health and recovery ratios.
122. We classified the buyer as "strategic" in nineteen cases (63%), as "financial" in ten cases
(33%), and as a mix of financial and strategic buyers in one case (3%). See infra Appendix C-2.
123. Stromberg, supra note 65, at 2665; Eckbo & Thorburn, Fire Sales, supra note 65, at 8.
124. Our variable is defined as the percentage of firms in the industry with an interest cover-
age ratio less than one in the year of the bankruptcy sale or reorganization. Sale is the date of the
sale order; reorganization is the date of the confirmation order. A firm is considered to be in the
industry if it has the same three-digit Standard Industrial Classification ("SIC") code as the debtor in
the year of bankruptcy sale or reorganization, or the same two-digit SIC code if Compustat shows
no firms in the industry that year. In calculating his variable, Stromberg added firms filing bank-
ruptcy in the year after the debtor because "[Swedish] firms that go bankrupt do not report any
financial statements for the period immediately preceding bankruptcy." Id. American public compa-
nies generally do report such statements.
125. The data are posted at http://www.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs.
126. We hesitate to imply a causal relationship between industry distress and the decision to
sell. We can, at best, say that we controlled for the decision to sell or reorganize in Models I1-V, and
that the addition of the Industry Interest Coverage variable to the model both increases the fit of the




We made two negative findings of importance. First, selling debtors' as-
sertions of nonviability did not correlate with reduced recoveries. Second,
larger debtors tended to choose reorganization over sale. When we con-
trolled for that choice, however, we found that larger debtors did not have
higher recovery ratios.
1. Asserted Nonviability Did Not Correlate with Low-Sale Recoveries
To sell their businesses, the debtors we studied had to justify their sales
to the bankruptcy courts. They did so through the testimony of executives or
advisors at sale approval hearings. Narrative excerpts of those justifications
appear in Appendix B. As the excerpts reflect, some debtors asserted nonvi-
ability-that is, they claimed they could not reorganize. Others claimed only
that sale would maximize the value of the estate, which suggests that reor-
ganization was an alternative. We hypothesized that these assertions were
valid proxies for viability.
One might expect that nonviability-the future inability to reorganize-
would have an adverse effect on sale prices. The absence of a reorganization
option would deprive the debtor of the ability to strike a hard bargain in the
common, single-bidder sale situation. Such a debtor would also be under
pressure to sell quickly, because the debtor's value presumably would be
declining with time.
To investigate that possibility, we coded the sale justifications as (1)
strong assertions of nonviability, (2) weak assertions of nonviability, and (3)
mere assertions that the debtor was maximizing value by selling. We added
the resulting variable to the model, first as a dummy variable combining (1)
and (2) and then as a dummy variable combining (2) and (3). Neither
dummy variable was a significant predictor of the recovery ratio. 1 7 Debtors
asserting viability did not receive better prices.
To investigate further, we compared these assertions of nonviability with
the time the companies were on the market. We considered a company to be
"on the market" from the time it retained its financial advisor to the time the
court approved the sale. We expected nonviable companies to be on the mar-
ket for shorter periods of time because their liquidity constraints would
force them into quicker sales. We found no significant relationship, however,
between asserted viability and time on the market.""
In seeking to justify their sales to the bankruptcy court, sixteen of the
thirty companies studied (53%) made strong assertions of non-viability.
That is, they represented to the court that they were unable to reorganize.
These statements ranged from GlobalStar's stark assertion that it would run
127. For both, p > .50.
128. The average time elapsed from retention of investment bankers to sale was 351 days. See
infra Appendix C-2. Among companies who said they were maximizing value, see infra Appendix
C-I (providing an explanation for each sale), the average time was shorter (316 days versus 362
days), but the difference of means is not statistically significant (F = 0.38, N = 28, p = .54).
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out of cash for administrative expenses "within weeks"'' 29 to Polaroid's
catchy metaphor that the company was "a melting ice cube."'3 ° We hypothe-
size that if the nonviability assertions were true, they would have been
reflected in declining cash reserves. Instead, we found that cash reserves
were slightly higher for nonviable companies, although the difference was
not statistically significant.
In combination, these findings left us suspicious of the debtors' asser-
tions of nonviability. The assertions were self serving. Debtors made the
assertions while seeking court approval of their proposed sales. Absent a
compelling reason to sell quickly, some debtors may have feared the court
would require that they comply with Chapter 11 plan formalities by making
adequate disclosure to creditors and giving creditors the opportunity to vote
on the sale. We suspect that the assertions were made opportunistically, to
maximize the likelihood of sale approval. The strength of the assertions may
have reflected debtors' levels of concern regarding sale approval or debtors'
willingness to exaggerate, rather than debtors' actual nonviability.
2. Larger Firms Did Not Have Higher Recovery Ratios
Measured by book asset values at filing, the companies sold were
smaller than the companies reorganized. The difference was marginally sig-
nificant (p = .069). But when we added company size, measured by asset
book value, to the regression, it was not statistically significant (p = .488).
We conclude that smaller companies did not have lower recovery ratios.
Thus, the smaller sizes of the companies sold cannot explain the lower re-
covery ratios for those companies.
Considering the foregoing analyses together, we reach the following
conclusions. Our model explains 63% of the variance in recovery ratios in
the forty-nine going-concern sale and reorganization cases studied. The
company's earnings, the choice between sale and reorganization, the length
of time from filing to case resolution, whether market factors were condu-
cive to mergers when the case is resolved, and the level of financial distress
in the debtors' industries each played a role. But the choice between sale
and reorganization was by far the most important factor. Recovery ratios are
higher when companies reorganize than when they sell as a going concern.
IV. EXPLAINING THE MARKET'S FAILURE
That reorganizations yield higher recovery ratios than going-concern sales
raises two issues. First, why did debtors, advised by leading professionals,
129. Motion of Debtors (I) to Approve the (A) Sale of Substantially All of Their Assets Free
and Clear of Interests and (B) Assumption and Assignment of Contracts and Leases in Connection
Therewith, or (II) Alternatively, for Authority to Wind Down Their Operations at 8, In re Globalstar
Capital Corp., No. 02-10499, (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 31, 2003).
130. Transcript of Sale Hearing Before Honorable Peter J. Walsh United States Chief Bank-
ruptcy Judge at 177, In re Polaroid Corp., No. 01-10864 (Bankr. D. Del. July 3, 2002) ("The
testimony is undisputed by both witnesses that the revenues of this company are falling off and both
of them analogized to... a melting ice cube.").
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increasingly choose the worse of two options? Second, why didn't creditors or
courts stop them?
A. Why Do Companies Sell Rather Than Reorganize?
The reasons undoubtedly vary from case to case, but certain factors are
pervasive. First, the participants in these cases, including managers, financial
advisors, creditors, and judges, are pursuing their own interests, not those of
the debtor companies.' 3' Economists and finance theorists refer to such pursuit
as an agency problem, but we consider corruption a clearer description.
1. Managers
In eleven of thirty sale cases, we were able to identify specific benefits
to CEOs resulting directly from the decision to sell. In four cases, the sale
triggered severance payments to the CEOs ranging from $662,000 to $1.55• • 132
million. In four additional cases, the buyer hired the CEO of the seller to
131. Kuney, supra note 83, at 109 ("[lInsiders may benefit from these sales, especially when
the majority of their postpetition compensation is tied to the sale of the corporation or where they
expect to be employed by the purchaser post sale.").
132. These four companies are ABC-NACO Inc., see ABC-NACO Inc., Proxy Statement Pursu-
ant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form Def 14A) at 6, 8 (May 22, 2001),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/913364/000095013101501596/0000950131-
01-501596.txt (last visited July 14, 2007) (indicating that CEO Vaughn Makary would be paid
$760,320 upon the sale of ABC-NACO Inc.), Casual Male Corp., see Casual Male Corp., Annual Re-
port Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-K), at 56, 59
(Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/792570/000092701601504321/
0000927016-01-504321.txt (last visited July 14, 2007) (indicating that CEO Alan Weinstein would
be paid $661,538 upon the sale of Casual Male Corp.), Einstein/Noah Bagel Corp., see Stipulation
and Agreed Order for Allowance and Immediate Payment of Administrative Severance Claim at 3-4,
In re Einstein/Noah Bagel Corp., Nos. 00-04447 and 00-04448 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 10, 2001)
(reporting that CEO Robert Hartnett would receive $1,324,658 upon the sale of Einstein/Noah Bagel
Corp.), and Phar-Mor, Inc., see Phar-Mor, Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-K), at 21, 32 (Oct. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/764960/0000950 15202007569/0000950152- 0 2 -l 0 7 56 9 .txt
(last visited July 14, 2007) (reporting that co-CEOs Abbey J. Butler and Melvyn J. Estrin were paid
a combined total of $3.1 million upon the sale of Phar-Mor, Inc.); Transcript of Hearing Before the
Honorable William T. Bodoh United States Bankruptcy Judge at 7, In re Phar-Mor, Inc., No. 01-
44007 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 27, 2002) (stating that Butler and Melvyn were also "included within
the [buyer] Phar-Mor Acquisitions LLC").
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work for the buyer after the sale.'33 In three others, the sellers' CEOs became
paid consultants to the buyers after the sale. 134
Of course, legitimate reasons may exist for the buyer of a bankrupt com-
pany to hire the seller's CEO. That in no way, however, changes the fact that
the expectation of such hiring provides the CEO with an incentive to sell.
Even the CEO who could stay on to run the reorganizing company
might find it safer or more profitable to sell and join the buyer. For example,
Polaroid's CEO resigned early in the bankruptcy case and was replaced by
two lower-level employees as co-CEOs. One had a base salary as CEO of
$375,000, the other $390,000."' After they took the job, Polaroid adopted a
retention bonus plan that resulted in their being paid $844,000 and $878,000
respectively in their final year of work. 116 They sold Polaroid to the sole bid-
der, One Equity Partners Imaging Corp. ("OEP"), for a price that was
widely condemned by the financial press as too low. 137 Immediately upon
closing the sale, OEP hired them to continue running the company as co-
CEOs. The two swore under oath that they had no contract to work for OEP
before they closed the sale. But they may not have needed one. The custom
appears to be that if the buyer hires the selling managers, the selling manag-
ers get a share of the buyer's equity in the company.'38 Indeed, a year after
133. These four companies are Cone Mills Corp., see Scott Malone, New Textile Behemoth:
Ross Forms $900M International Textile Group, Poised to Take On China, WWD (N.Y.), Mar. 18,
2004, at I (reporting that Cone Mills Corp. CEO John Bakane was retained by buyer International
Textile Group as CEO of the Cone Denim division of the company), Genuity Inc., see Genuity and
Level 3 Complete Acquisition, Bus. WIRE (S.F.), Feb. 4, 2003 (reporting that Genuity Inc. CEO Paul
R. Gudonis will be hired by buyer Level 3 Communications as executive vice president), Polaroid,
see LoPucxj, supra note 46, at 179 (indicating that co-CEOs William Flaherty and Neal Goldman
were hired by the buyer OEP following the sale of the company and received stock in OEP "proba-
bly worth $3 million to $4 million"), and Rouge Industries, Inc., see Jeff Bennett, Severstal Mill Is
Making Changes as Prices Jump, DETROIT FREE-PREsS, Feb. 28, 2004, at 13A (reporting that Rouge
Industries, Inc., CEO Carl Valdiserri expects to be retained by buyer Severstal as a member of the
executive committee following the sale of Rouge Industries, Inc.).
134. These three companies are ANC Rental Corp., see Tom Stieghorst, Hedge Company
Buys ANC Assets; New Company to Be Called Vanguard, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.).
Oct. 16, 2003, at ID (stating that former ANC Rental Corp. CEO Bill Plamondon would serve as a
consultant to the buying company, Vanguard Car Rental USA Inc), Asia Global Crossing Ltd., see
Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Asia Global Crossing sale complete, DAILY DEAL (N.Y.), Mar. 12, 2003
(stating that Asia Global Crossing Ltd. CEO Jack Scanlon will be retained by buyer Asia Netcom
Corp. Ltd. as a consultant following the sale of the company), and Globalstar Capital Corp., see
Globalstar, L.P., Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Form 10-Q), at 46 (Aug. 14, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/933401/000089161803004420/f92214e10vq.htm (last visited July 14, 2007) (reporting that
CEO Olof Lundberg resigned from his position at Globalstar Capital Corp. and would remain as a
consultant throughout the sale process).
135. LoPucKI, supra note 46, at 178.
136. Id. at 178-79.
137. See supra note 57.
138. Deposition of William L. Flaherty, Exhibit 107 at 162, In re Polaroid Corp., No. 01-
10864 (Bankr. D. Del. July 1, 2003) ("Generally, if the new equity owners of the company wish to




the sale closing, Polaroid disclosed that each of the two employees in ques-
tion owned stock in OEP valued at $3 million to $4 million.
3 9
We probably have only scratched the surface of managerial corruption in
these cases. The companies we studied typically stopped making public dis-
closures as soon as they decided to sell, making information on management
perks difficult to obtain. All thirty were public companies prior to bankruptcy.
Each filed at least one annual report with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in the two years prior to bankruptcy. But only Polaroid filed such a
report for the year of the sale or any subsequent year. Fifteen of the thirty
formally terminated their duty to file reports by filing SEC Form 15; the re-
mainder simply stopped filing.'4 Twelve of the thirty buyers were public
companies that filed postpurchase annual reports. Eleven of the twelve men-
tion the purchase in those reports.' 4' But few said more about the purchase
than the name of the seller and the amount of the purchase price.1
4 2
After going dark, the bankrupt companies still typically filed monthly
operating reports with the bankruptcy court and sometimes with the SEC.1
4 3
But those reports contained skeletal financial data and few or no explana-
tions. Thus, if managers received side payments or benefits from the sales of
their companies or acquired stock in the purchasers, that information was
available to us as researchers only if it happened to be elicited during the
sale hearing and a transcript of the sale hearing happened to be placed in the
court file.
2. Financial Advisors
The investment bankers who arrange the sales are not an effective check
on sale prices either. Formally, the debtors hire the bankers to explore sale
or reorganization options. If the companies decide to pursue sales, the in-
vestment bankers solicit prospective purchasers. Typically, this means they
139. LoPucKi, supra note 46, at 179.
140. The filings are available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited May 14, 2007).
141. Those that filed were the buyers of Allegiance Telecom, Inc. (XO Communications),
Bethlehem Steel Corp. (International Steel Group), Budget Group, Inc. (Cendant Corporation),
Coho Energy, Inc. (Denbury Resources), Cone Mills Corp. (W.L. Ross & Co.), Einstein/Noah Bagel
Corp. (New World Coffee), Genuity Inc. (Level 3 Communications), Impath Inc. (Genzyme), The IT
Group, Inc. (Shaw Group), National Steel Corp. (United States Steel), Velocita Corp. (AT&T), and
Weirton Steel Corp. (International Steel Group). Those that did not file were the buyers of ABC-
NACO, Inc. (Three Cities Railco Acquisition), ANC Rental Corp. (Cerebus/Car Acquisition Com-
pany LLC (Vanguard), Asia Global Crossing Ltd. (Asian Netcom Corporation Ltd.), Casual Male
Corp. (Designs, Inc.), divine, Inc. (DS&M Newco, Outtask, Saratoga DMS, Bear Investment), DTI
Teleport, Inc. (CenturyTel), Flooring America, Inc. (Atlantic National Trust, LLC), Globalstar Capi-
tal Corp. (Thermo Capital Partners LLC), The Grand Union Co. (C&S Purchasers), International
Fibercom, Inc. (TenX Capital Partners, LLC), Kellstrom Industries, Inc. (KIAC), Network Plus
Corp. (Broadview Networks), Phar-Mor, Inc. (Hillco-Ozer), Pillowtex Corp. (GGST LLC), Polaroid
Corp. (One Equity Partners), Rouge Industries, Inc. (Severstal OAO), U.S. Aggregates, Inc. (Old-
Castle Materials, Inc.), Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc. (TransWorld Entertainment).
142. See supra note 141.




structure the sales, prepare brochures, send them to likely purchasers, find
"stalking horses" who commit to buy the assets at specific prices if not out-
bid, and then conduct auctions. Prospective bidders are required to sign
confidentiality agreements before they are given access to the "data rooms"
in which they can examine the companies' financial records. On average,
eighty prospects are contacted for each sale, and thirty sign confidentiality
agreements. But the average number of bidders is only 1.6 per sale. In fif-
teen of the twenty-six cases for which we have data (58%), there was only
one bidder.'4
This thin market, combined with the fire-sale prices obtained, reflects
and creates conflicts of interest for the investment bankers. The investment
bankers have little reason to maximize the sale prices. Some receive "suc-
cess fees" equal to one percent of the price. But, as is often the case with
real estate brokers and contingency fee lawyers, the increase in the fee re-
sulting from a higher obtainable price is not worth the effort necessary to
obtain that higher price. The flat percentage fee creates an incentive to pro-
vide the low level of effort necessary to sell at a low price and earn the bulk
of the fee, rather than the high level of effort necessary to sell at a high price
and earn the maximum fee. The investment bankers have little reason to
curry favor with the sellers who hired them; the companies are going out of
business so the interests of the managers and professionals tend to dominate
the hiring decisions.
The problem may extend beyond lack of incentive to seek the highest
price. Investment bankers may even have reason to minimize the price. Under-
pricing creates value that the investment banker can deliver to a grateful buyer.
The grateful buyer may, in turn, compensate the investment banker with future
business. To avoid complaints from the debtor's management, the grateful
buyer may also be willing to give the managers a cut. The low prices do not
diminish the investment bankers' reputations because the sold companies go
dark. Only in rare cases such as Polaroid do outsiders ever come to realize that
the price was low in relation to the company's actual value.
To be chosen as the stalking horse was a crucial advantage. The invest-
ment bank advising on the sale had the ability to confer this advantage and
the incentive to confer it on someone who would reciprocate the favor. A
stalking horse was selected in twenty-six cases and became the buyer in
twenty-two (85%). 145 The stalking horses were protected from competitive
bids by breakup fees averaging 2.3% of the stalking horse price. In addition,
the terms of sale required that a competing bidder's first bid, on average, be
at least 3.7% higher than the stalking horse price. The effect of these "bid
protections" was to discriminate against outside bidders. On average, a bid-
der at the auction sale had to offer 3.7% more than the stalking horse to bid
144. The data are posted at http://www.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs. In an earlier study, Hotchkiss
and Mooradian found an even higher percentage of single bidder sales. Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert
M. Mooradian, Acquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11, 7 J. FIN. INTERME-
DIATION 240, 243 (1998) (finding that only eighteen of fifty-five sales had more than one bidder).
145. The data are posted at http://www.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs.
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at all, and the challenger's highest bid would be rejected if it were not at
least 2.3% higher than the stalking horse's highest bid.
The investment bank also had the ability and incentive to maximize the
advantage conferred by rushing the sale. On average, 351 days elapsed from
the debtor's retention of the investment bank to the court's approval of the
sale. But from the moment the stalking horse contract was signed, the sale
process became rushed. On average, the court entered its order fixing the
terms of bidding 14 days after the stalking horse signed, and the auction
took place 30 days after entry of the order.
146
The potential for these conflicts to affect sale prices was illustrated in
the Polaroid case:
Shortly after Polaroid filed for reorganization in Delaware on October 12,
2001, the company entered into a contract to sell its Identification Systems
Division unit to the manager in charge of it for $32 million. The sale re-
quired court approval after a public opportunity to bid. Insisting that the
sale was urgent, Polaroid sought to limit the opportunity for outside bid-
ding to the extent it could. Polaroid's investment bankers, Dresdner,
Kleinwort, Wasserstein, said they had shopped the Identification Systems
Division thoroughly and that $32 million was the best offer they could get.
But when Polaroid tried to get Judge Walsh to approve the sale for $32
million, several would be bidders appeared in court to protest that they
hadn't been solicited, they had difficulty getting bid packages from
Dresdner, Kleinwort, Wasserstein, and Polaroid was trying to push the sale
through without giving them time to prepare their bids. Judge Walsh ex-
tended the bidding period by ten days, and competitive bidding pushed the
price to $60 million. Later, an Identification Systems executive said that in
shopping the company, Dresdner, Kleinwort, Wasserstein had been asking
for $75 million to $125 million, an excessive price that had discouraged
bidding. It appears that bidders who came forward on their own thwarted
Polaroid management's attempt to sell Polaroid's Identification Systems
Division to one of their colleagues at a bargain basement price.147
Traditionally, bankruptcy auctions have been public. Competing courts,
however, usually allow them to take place privately, in the offices of the
debtors' attorneys.
As Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel, Douglas Baird, Robert Rasmussen,
Harvey R. Miller, Shai Waisman, and others have noted, DIP lenders also
have incentives with respect to section 363 sales that conflict with those of
the estate. 48 DIP lenders make high-interest loans to debtors at the begin-
146. The data are posted at http://www.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs.
147. LoPUCKI, supra note 46, at 173-74.
148. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Cor-
porate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1209, 1249-50 (2006) (expressing concern that the
"informational advantage" of a DI lender that seeks to purchase may cast a pall over the ensuing
auction); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 173
(2005) ("Absent a neutral, multiparty forum, secured lenders will likely exert their influence over a
debtor and advocate a sale, as their preference is inherently toward the certainty of recovery that a
sale can provide."); Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for
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ning of the bankruptcy cases and, assuming the recovery is sufficient-as it
almost always is-are paid in full at the end. The DIP lender that will be
paid in full from the sale has an incentive to push for a sale, even if the price
is substantially below the company's value. In some cases, the DIP lenders
seek to acquire the company at sale. Whether or not the DIP lender is the
buyer, the DIP lender may have control over the pace and terms of the sale,
and thus also the ability to turn it into a fire sale. 
49
For example, in one of the sale cases studied, Budget Group filed for
bankruptcy while negotiating a sale of its business. 50 Budget arranged DIP
financing from Credit Suisse First Boston under terms that would put
Budget in default if it failed to have a "definitive agreement" to sell its busi-
ness within fifty days of filing. 5' The creditors' committee objected to the
financing on the ground that it "threaten[ed] the Debtors' and the Commit-
tee's ability to conclude negotiations on terms and conditions beneficial to
the Debtors.' 52 Budget agreed to sell to Cendant before the drop dead date
in the DIP lending agreement, rendering the objection moot. But the very
existence of such drop dead dates probably depresses sale prices.
B. Why Don't Creditors Object?
When companies are sold for less than they are worth, the unsecured
creditors are usually the losers. Typically, they will recover less than they
would have in reorganization. We did not systematically collect data regard-
ing the committees' positions on these sales. We did, however, discover that
the committees in at least two of the cases, Polaroid and IT Group, opposed
the sales. 1 3 In both cases, the committees sought to propose their own
Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CI. L. REV. 425 (2006) (reviewing LoPucKI,
supra note 46).
149. See Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 784-85 ("The control that
the lender has over cash collateral makes it hard to enter into a financing arrangement without its
explicit blessing. Its blessing can be contingent upon many things, including a requirement that the
firm be sold as a going concern within a fixed period of time." (footnote omitted)). Baird and Ras-
mussen note that "[t]hese revolving credit facilities and the practical control they give lenders over a
firm are some of the most striking changes in Chapter II practice over the last twenty years.' Id. at
785.
150. Limited Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' to Final Entry of
Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing from Credit Suisse First Bos-
ton, as Agent at 3-4, In re Budget Group, Inc., No. 02-12152 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 19, 2002).
151. Id.
152. Id. at5.
153. See Objection by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Debtors' Motion for
an Order Approving (1) Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors' Assets to the Shaw Group, Inc., (II)
Bidding Procedures, (III) Break-Up Fee and Expense Reimbursement, and (IV) Other Related Re-
lief, In re IT Group, Inc., No. 02-10118 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 17, 2002); Order Authorizing the
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to File Its Objection to the Debtors' Motion for an Order
(I) Authorizing and Approving a Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors' Assets to OEP Imaging
Corporation, (II) Establishing Bidding Procedures in Connection with the Sale and Approving Bid
Protections, Including Expense Reimbursement and Termination Payment, and (III) Granting Other
Relief Under Seal, In re Polaroid Corp., No. 0 1-10864 (Bankr. D. Del. May 7, 2002).
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reorganization plans but were unable to finance them. In both cases, the
courts approved the sales over the committees' continuing objections. 3
4
In In re Radnor Holdings Corp., a case excluded from our study only
because the company did not report the value of its assets at the time of fil-
ing, the creditors' committee did more than object. The committee filed suit
against the buyer at the sale, Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC, accusing
Tennenbaum of an "inequitable scheme ... to acquire the Debtors' operat-
ing assets at a grossly inadequate price through the mechanism of [a 363
sale]." 155 The committee alleged a scheme in which Tennenbaum had bought
enough stock to give it effective control of Radnor, caused Radnor to borrow
more money from Tennenbaum than Radnor could repay, forced Radnor
into a bankruptcy sale, made itself the stalking horse, and then structured the
bid procedures "in a way that made it virtually impossible for anyone other
than Tennenbaum to even consider bidding."'' 56 The case was tried in the
Delaware bankruptcy court, which ruled in favor of Tennenbaum.'57
The existence of cases such as Polaroid, IT Group, and Radnor makes
clear that creditors do not always favor the proposed sales. In at least some
cases, they go to their fates kicking and screaming.
Several sale process characteristics reduce both the likelihood that unse-
cured creditors will object and the likelihood that their objections will
succeed. First, to know that the sale price is inadequate, a party may need to
spend millions of dollars for an independent valuation.'58 Few unsecured
creditors have a stake in the sale large enough to warrant such an expense.
Creditors' committees are in a position to spend that kind of money because
they can charge the cost to the estate. 59 But members of creditors' commit-
tees often have private agendas that conflict with the interests of the
creditors they represent.' 6° Second, even if the committee is faithful to the
154. Transcript of Hearing Before Honorable Mary F. Walrath United States Bankruptcy
Court Judge, In re IT Group, Inc., No. 02-10118 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 26, 2002).
155. Complaint at 2, Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Radnor Holdings Corp. v.
Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC (In re Radnor Holdings Corp.), 353 B.R. 820 (Bankr. D. Del.
2006) (No. 06-10894).
156. Id. at33.
157. Tennenbaum Capital Partners, 353 B.R. 820. Of course, we have no way of knowing
whether the court's findings were correct. We cite this case merely to refute the often-made argu-
ment that the creditors support the section 363 sales. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Words That
Wound: Defining, Discussing, and Defeating Bankruptcy "Corruption ", 54 BUFF. L. REV. 365, 370
n.14 (2006) ("[Clourts might also have approved such sales because no one objected to them.").
158. Breakup fees are often justified as reimbursement of the stalking horse's expenses in
preparing to bid. In the cases we studied, breakup fees averaged $5 million per case. The data are
available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs. A would-be objector might need to go through the
same process to know whether the price was adequate.
159. The committees are able to employ attorneys and financial advisors at the estate's ex-
pense. Ultimately, much of those costs fall on the unsecured creditors the committee represents, but
the estate's obligation to pay makes it possible for the committee to spend the money.
160. See, e.g., LYNN M. LoPUCKI & CHRISTOPHER R. MIRICK, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS § 10.07(A) (5th ed. 2006) (listing possible conflicts). The authors fur-
ther note that "[t]he fact that a creditor's primary interest is not collection of the debt does not alone
disqualify the creditor from appointment to the committee or constitute grounds for removal." Id.
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creditors' interests, it is unlikely to be a match for the debtor in a fight over
whether to sell or reorganize. Debtors spend about four times as much in
professional fees as do all of the committees representing creditors and
shareholders combined.16 The greater expenditures, together with the in-
formation advantage that accrues from operational control, give debtors the
upper hand. Lastly, as is discussed in the next section, the bankruptcy courts
are unlikely to rule in the creditors' favor even when their objections are
well taken. Efforts to oppose a sale usually produce only conflict and delay,
to the unsecured creditors' further disadvantage.
C. Why Do Courts Approve Inadequate-Price Sales?
To sell assets outside the ordinary course of business, a debtor must ob-
tain the approval of the bankruptcy court. A decision of a bankruptcy court
approving a sale is final. Appellate courts cannot overturn bankruptcy court
sale approvals. 161
The prevailing case law requires debtors to prove they have "good busi-
ness reasons" for selling.'6 Our comparison of sale and reorganization
recoveries, together with the reasons companies gave for selling, suggests
that few of their reasons were good. Eight never claimed lack of a reorgani-
zation alternative but rather said they were selling in order to maximize the
estate. 65 Our findings suggest such claims are generally false. Another six
also seemed to acknowledge that they had a reorganization alternative but
asserted that it was riskier and so less desirable than the sale. '66 Sixteen
made the self-serving claim that they had no reorganization alternative.1
67
The fact that these sixteen companies did not sell for significantly less than
the companies that admitted to viability suggests that they may have been• 168
exaggerating. The fact that the sales produced far less value than the reor-
ganizations, even after controlling for the financial conditions of firms sold
161. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advisors: An Empirical
Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies 3, 5, 6 (July 3, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=913841 (finding that 79% of court-awarded pro-
fessional fees and expenses are for services rendered directly to the debtor).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000) ("The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may...
sell.., other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.").
163. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) provides that "[tihe reversal ... on appeal of an authorization [to
sell].., does not affect the validity of a sale ... to an entity that purchased ... in good
faith... unless such [sale was] stayed pending appeal." Id. § 363(m). Bankruptcy courts routinely
block use of the good faith exception by finding as a fact that the buyer acted in good faith. They
routinely block the use of stays by fixing supersedeas bonds in amounts exceeding what objectors
can post.
164. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071
(2d Cir. 1983). For a discussion of Lionel, see Rose, supra note 52.
165. See infra Appendix B.
166. See infra Appendix B.
167. See infra Appendix B. The claims were made at the hearings in which the debtors sought
approval of sales to which the debtors had already agreed.
168. See supra Section II.B. I.
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and reorganized, suggests that many of these firms could have generated
higher recoveries by reorganizing. Nevertheless, we know of no modem
case in which a large public company debtor proposed a sale and the court
refused to approve it. Hearings are held and arguments made, but in the end
the debtor that wants to sell gets its way.161
We think court competition explains the bankruptcy courts' passivity.
Formally, all of the sales were proposed by the debtors. DIP lenders were
sometimes the driving force behind the sales, but they came to the court for
sale approval in alliance with the debtor. We assume for the purpose of ar-
gument that no one objected to many of the sales.
None of this relieved the courts of the obligation to determine that the
sales were in compliance with the law. 70 The courts did in fact hold hearings
and make the necessary findings before approving the sales. In at least one
case, IT Group, the court appointed an examiner to investigate the reorgani-
zation alternative.
7'
The courts were not, however, without their own stake in the matter. The
period covered by our study included the peak years of the biggest large
public company bankruptcy boom in history. The courts were in active
competition for the cases. 73 Two courts-the Manhattan Division of the
Southern District of New York and the District of Delaware-together at-
tracted 191 of the 336 cases filed nationally (57%). 174 Those cases produced
billions of dollars in fees for local bankruptcy professionals, and substantial
industries in New York City and Wilmington. 75 Joseph Biden, senator from
Delaware, vehemently defends his state's advantage. 76 Astute commentators
assume that the opposition of Senator Biden makes ending the bankruptcy
court competition impossible. 177
169. Bernstein, supra note 27, at 6 ("Today, however, bankruptcy judges are more willing than
ever before to entertain the sale of the debtor's entire business.").
170. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provides that "[n]o provision of this title ... shall be construed to
preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or
appropriate to enforce or implement.., rules." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000).
171. See infra Appendix B.
172. The boom peaked in 2001 with the filing of ninety-seven large public company cases.
See LoPucki, supra note 68. The query that generates these statistics considers all cases and aggre-
gates them by year filed.
173. LoPUCKI, supra note 46, at 124-28.
174. See LoPucki, supra note 68. The query that generates these statistics considers cases
disposed of in 2000-2004 and aggregates them by city filed.
175. LoPUCKI, supra note 46, at 128-29, 132 (describing the economic significance of the
shift in cases to Delaware and New York City).
176. See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden Jr., Give Credit to Good Courts, LEGAL TIMES, June 20, 2005
(attacking Lynn M. LoPucki's scholarship regarding the Delaware bankruptcy court); Lynn M.
LoPucki, Courting the Big Bankrupts, LEGAL TIMES, July 18, 2005 (responding to Senator Biden).
177. Brady C. Williamson, former chair of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission,
commented as follows:
Whatever the virtues and vices of the venue statute ... they will not change in our lifetime
.... And the reason is quite simple. It lies primarily in the make-up of the United States
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The bankruptcy court competition dates to 1990, when the Delaware
bankruptcy court began attracting cases."' Prior to that, section 363 sales
were rare. 179 The courts constrained the sales' s° and apparently did not ap-
prove breakup fees.' 8' The first reported breakup fee decision was in 1992
and by 1995 section 363 sales were common.12
Had courts in any of the competing cities ruled against the case placers
by refusing to confirm the sales they proposed, future case placers would
have avoided those cities. The offending courts-and the judges sitting on
them-would have slipped into the obscurity of managing consumer bank-
ruptcies and chapter 11 cases too small to forum shop.
D. If Sales Are Bargains, Why Don't Bids Go Higher?
Bankrupt large public companies are difficult and expensive to evaluate.
Each potential bidder must make a substantial investment to put itself in a
position to bid. s8 If it loses the bid, it also loses that investment. To offset so
large a risk, a potential bidder must have a substantial chance of being the
successful bidder with a bid substantially below the company's value. Ab-
sent that, bidding at a sale would not make economic sense.
In most of the sales we examined, the debtors addressed this problem by
offering bidding incentives to a stalking horse. In essence, they paid some-
one to make the first bid. The principal incentives were cash payments, in
the form of breakup fees paid to the stalking horses if they were outbid, and
bid increment requirements that barred competing bidders from bidding just
slightly more than the stalking horse. These incentives likely attracted some
stalking horses who would not otherwise have bid. At the same time, they
made it even more difficult for second bidders. Second bidders could buy
the companies at the substantial discounts necessary to justify the costs of
bidding only if the second bidders valued the company substantially more
highly than did the stalking horses.
Senate and the membership of the Senate Judiciary Committee. As long as Senator Joseph Bi-
den of Delaware is in the Senate... the status quo will not vary.
Brady C. Williamson, Comments, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 507, 508 (2006).
178. LoPUCKI, supra note 46, at 49-50 (describing the early rise of the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court).
179. LoPucki, supra note 68 (search for cases reaching these dispositions: 363 sale confirmed;
363 sale converted; 363 sale dismissed; 363 sale No data; 363 sale pending). The search shows three
363 sales from 1980 through 1989, three from 1990 through 1994, and seventy since 1994.
180. For example, the court declined to approve a section 363 sales in Lionel, supra note 52.
181. National Bankruptcy Conference, Report of Subcommittee on Section 363(b) Sales in
Chapter II Cases (March, 2007) ("Under the Bankruptcy Act and the first 10 or so years under the
Code, the only benefit accorded a stalking horse bidder was a court approved bid cushion, e.g., a bid
of $1 million required a competing bid at the sale to be at least $1,025,000. The first reported
breakup fee decision was a $6 million fee approved in 1992 in In re Integrated Resources, Inc., 135
B.R. 746 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).")
182. Id.
183. See supra note 158 (noting that breakup fees designed to compensate for the cost of
preparing bids averaged $5 million in the cases studied).
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The result was that second bidders appeared in only eight of twenty-
three stalking horse cases (35%) and were successful in only four of those
cases (17%). The rarity with which stalking horses are displaced led us to
reconceptualize the selection of the stalking horse as the true sale and the
auction as merely a control to prevent the formal exclusion of other pros-
pects.
That reconceptualization makes apparent that, in the absence of effective
court oversight, the sale process is vulnerable to subversion. For example,
an investment banker who installs a favored customer as stalking horse may
be able to defend the apparently weak choice as not determinative because
competitors have the opportunity to overbid. But in fact, the ability of out-
siders to overbid at the auction is largely illusory. Investment bankers
probably have the ability, with some uncertainty, to pass bargains along to
favored clients.
E. Have Sales Been Increasing?
In The End of Bankruptcy and Chapter 11 at Twilight, Baird and
Rasmussen argued that sales of bankrupt large public companies were increas-
ing 8 5 and used that increase to argue that the sales were value-maximizing. 8
6
Later, Baird expanded the claim by writing that "Chapter 11 has morphed into
,,117
a branch of the law governing mergers and acquisitions.
Figure 1 shows the number and percent of large public company Chapter
11 cases that ended in liquidation for each of the years 1987 through 2006."' s
184. The data are available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs.
185. Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 751-52 ("Corporate reorganiza-
tions have all but disappeared. Giant corporations make headlines when they file for Chapter 11, but
they are no longer using it to rescue a firm from imminent failure"). The authors then describe
seyeral recent, large cases in which companies used Chapter 11 as "a convenient auction block." Id.
See also Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter II at Twilight, supra note 3, at 679 ("The large Chapter lIs
of 2002 confirm our claim in The End of Bankruptcy that going-concern sales and implementation
of prenegotiated deals now dominate the scene.").
186. Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note 3, at 675 ("[Wlhatever value
exists is usually best preserved through a sale."). The authors state further that "across the broad
range of cases, asset sales do not destroy going-concern value." Id. at 692. Echoing Baird and
Rasmussen, prominent bankruptcy professionals Harvey Miller and Shai Waisman wrote the following:
The prevalence of asset sales under section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code ... is attributable
to many factors besides increasingly powerful creditors. Robust capital markets facilitate the
pooling of massive amounts of capital by groups of investors, typically in the form of altema-
tive investment vehicles such as private equity and leveraged buyout funds, hedge funds, and
vulture funds, in order to purchase or control companies of sizes previously not thought possi-
ble ....
Miller & Waisman, supra note 148, at 156.
187. Baird, supra note 6, at 75.
188. A liquidation for this purpose is the Chapter II case of a large public company from
which the debtor did not "emerge" as that term is defined in the Bankruptcy Research Database. See
LoPucki, supra note 68. Generally speaking, a company emerges if it continues in business as a
stand-alone company after confirmation of a Chapter II plan. A company does not emerge if it is
sold pursuant to section 363 or if it is merged with a purchaser of substantial size under the plan.
Lynn M. LoPucki, Protocols for the Bankruptcy Research Database (on file with the authors).
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Both the number and percent increased substantially from 1988 to 2002-
when Baird and Rasmussen initially declared the end of traditional reor-
ganizations. But the number of liquidations began a steep decline the
following year, and the percentage of liquidations crashed in 2005. By 2006,
both the number and percentage of bankruptcy liquidations had returned to
mid-1990s levels. The number and percentage of section 363 sales-not
shown on the Figure-declined even more precipitously."9
FIGURE I
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF LARGE PUBLIC COMPANY CHAPTER I I
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We interpret these recent reversals as proof that increasing market effi-
ciency was not the principal force behind the earlier upward trends. Market
efficiency has suffered no recent setback that might account for the trend's
sharp reversal.
Instead, we see the number and proportion of liquidating bankruptcies as
the product of numerous, constantly changing factors. They include debt
levels, secured debt levels, interest rates, money supply, availability of bank-
ruptcy alternatives such as assignments for the benefit of creditors,
managerial attitudes, court competition, technology, fads, and a cyclical
component. In the buildup to the boom that peaked in 2001 and 2002, reor-
ganizations increased along with liquidations, suggesting that some of the
189. The numbers of section 363 sales of large public companies fell from seventeen in 2003
to five in 2004, and one in 2005. In 2006 there were two. Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research
Database (on file with the authors). This version of the database is larger than the online version
cited in note 68 above. Because-some cases filed in these years remain pending, the number liqui-
dating the business in section 363 sales may increase.
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new liquidations were companies that would not have filed either kind of
case in an earlier era rather than companies that would have filed reorgani-
zations.' 90 Only through a regression analysis that controlled for other kinds
of changes could one credibly attribute some portion of the increase in sales
to supposed improvements in the market for large public companies. The
simple increase in the number and proportion of bankruptcy going-concern
sales prior to 2004 does not warrant the conclusion that the market for large
public companies has improved.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy going-concern sales can provide a substitute for bankruptcy
reorganization only if, for a given company, the sale can realize at least as
much value as a reorganization. Otherwise, reorganization should continue
in order to maximize value.
We found that, on average, reorganizations yielded 80% or 91% of book
value, while sales yielded only 35% of book value. Those findings warrant
the conclusion that, on average, companies sell for less than would be real-
ized in their reorganizations. To reach a contrary conclusion, one might
suppose that the best and strongest companies were reorganized while the
worst and weakest were sold. But if debtors could sell their companies for
as much as they would bring in reorganization, the statistically significant
difference in sale and reorganization recoveries would never have arisen.
Sale or reorganization would have been equally likely for each company and
the pattern of sale or reorganization choices random. That the difference
arose demonstrates at minimum that reorganization was sufficiently prefer-
able to sale in high-recovery cases to warrant the cost of sorting the cases. If
the reorganized companies had to be sold in some new regime, whatever
reorganization advantage caused them to sort themselves under the old re-
gime would be lost.
Our finding that the choice between sale and reorganization remains
highly significant, even when we control for the financial condition of the
company, suggests considerably more. It is theoretically possible that large
differences in value existed among the companies studied; that those differ-
ences were not reflected in either book values or EBITDA; and that, for
some reason not yet explained, those differences were highly correlated with
the choice between sale and reorganization, with the weaker companies
choosing sale. But barring such unlikely, unidentified differences, our find-
ings demonstrate that large public companies were sold in bankruptcy
going-concern sales for less than half what they would have been worth in
reorganization.
Possible explanations for this market failure are not in short supply. The
managers who decided to sell these companies rather than reorganize them
190. For example, in Esopus Creek Value LP v. Hauf, 913 A.2d 593 (Del. Ch. 2006), a corpo-
ration not in financial difficulty filed a bankruptcy case and sought to sell all or substantially all of
its assets under section 363. The purpose of the filing was to avoid Delaware's requirement of a
shareholder vote as a prerequisite to sale.
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frequently had conflicts of interest. So did the investment bankers who ad-
vised the managers and solicited bids. The stalking-horse bidders received
protections in the form of breakup fees and substantial minimum bid incre-
ments that discouraged other bidders. The costs of participating in the
bidding were high because the companies' situations were complex and
changed rapidly. Bidders other than the stalking horse had little chance of
winning. As a result, only a single bidder appeared at most bankruptcy auc-
tions. The process from the hiring of the financial advisor to the court's
order approving the sale was generally leisurely, averaging just under a year.
In only five of twenty-nine cases (17%) did it take less than 180 days. But
once the stalking horse was selected, the cases were fast tracked. The aver-
age time from execution of the stalking horse contract to the auction was
only 41 days, giving competing bidders little time to organize. Together,
these findings demonstrate, and at least partially explain, the failure of go-
ing-concern sales as an alternative to reorganization.
The bankruptcy courts have an obligation to ensure that debtors in pos-
session and their professionals act in the best interests of the debtors' estates
when choosing between going-concern sale and reorganization. Our find-











October 2007] Bankruptcy Fire Sales 47
w 0
oi 000










Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:1
0 2 a, o
00 0 ~ a, 2 2 o2 0 a 0 CC
0 0 0 0 a, a, 0 0 0 0











October 2007] Bankruptcy Fire Sales 49
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:1
Bankruptcy Fire Sales 51October 2007]
52 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:1
Bankruptcy Fire Sales 53October 2007]
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:1
October 2007] Bankruptcy Fire Sales
56 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:1
-% -4 -O -' - - -- -- - 4 C- - - O0E
z .B
4 Eo





. ... .5 . .5; - 5 5• 4 -, - -.- . i . -
October 20071 Bankruptcy Fire Sales 57
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:1

















60 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:1
